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What Does the Public Know 
about Economic Policy, 
and How Does It Know It? 
A long tradition in economic theory models economic policy deci-
sions as solutions to optimization problems solved by rational and well-
informed agents:1 a single policymaker minimizes a loss function subject
to some constraints. Another body of literature models policy decisions as
if they were made by well-informed voters in elections of some sort.2
As everyone knows, each of these approaches is allegorical in some
respects, two of which are germane to this paper. First, apart from votes
on school budgets and on some bond issues, economic (and other) policy
decisions are rarely made by direct democracy. We instead utilize repre-
sentative democracy, in which elected politicians decide on our behalf.
Second, in many cases the agents making the decisions may be neither as
well informed nor as rational as homo economicus. Robert Blendon and
his coauthors, for example, ﬁnd large gaps between measured economic
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1. “Well informed” need not connote perfectly informed. A large literature, of course,
deals with imperfect information.
2. Black (1948) is an early reference on the median voter model. Downs (1957)
extended the model to allow for political parties. See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a
modern treatment of political economy.
3. Blendon and others (1997).
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function model. Decisions there are made by a technocrat or by a commit-
tee of technocrats, many of whom think like (or are) economists.4 But ﬁs-
cal policy clearly is not made this way. Even if one models the president
of the United States as minimizing a loss function, the president’s recom-
mendation is just the starting point of a long process of political horse
trading. There may be 536 relevant loss functions rather than just one—
and they will not all be the same. Similarly, a complex brew of politicians
makes the major decisions in virtually all other areas of economic policy:
labor laws, tax laws, environmental policy, and social insurance pro-
grams, to name just a few.5
Of course, the fact that the voting and loss function models are alle-
gorical does not necessarily make them misleading, when interpreted as
“as if” hypotheses. But to make a judgment on the applicability of these
models of decisionmaking, it seems worth digging down deeper into the
actual processes that guide policymaking. This paper takes a step in that
direction.
Speciﬁcally, we take it as axiomatic that, ﬁrst, the political mechanism
makes almost all important economic policy decisions, and second, the
decisions of elected politicians are heavily inﬂuenced by public opinion.
These are hardly dazzling insights. The ﬁrst statement is simply a fact; it
is also central to both standard approaches to the economic theory of pol-
icymaking: loss functions and voting. The second is rarely discussed by
economists in their scholarly work. But its importance is apparent from
the tremendous resources that politicians devote to assessing public opin-
ion, and there is plenty of supportive evidence in political science.6
Legitimate doubts have been raised about whether the types of ques-
tions commonly asked in public opinion polls elicit individuals’ true pref-
erences.7 That is not our question here, because understanding the
determinants of public opinion as expressed in standard polls remains
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4. On the difference between individual and group decisionmaking in monetary policy,
see Blinder and Morgan (forthcoming).
5. Why this is so is an interesting question that we do not deal with here. See Blinder
(1997).
6. Among the many references that could be cited, see Page and Shapiro (1983) and
Monroe (1979).
7. See, for example, Kahneman (1986).
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This point remains valid irrespective of whether people understand the
issues well or are confused about them, whether they are self-interested or
public spirited, and whether they are well informed or poorly informed. 
If we accept these points, a host of interesting questions arise, two of
which are the foci of this paper. First, to what extent is mass public opin-
ion shaped by political ideology, self-interest, and—don’t laugh—
economic knowledge? Second, to the extent that knowledge is relevant to
opinions on economic issues, how do people inform themselves? 
This paper offers many detailed answers to these and related questions,
and so it may be useful to begin with a broad characterization that may
help the reader see the forest amid all the trees to follow. Subject to many
caveats, our main ﬁnding is that ideology is the most consistently impor-
tant determinant of public opinion on a number of major economic policy
issues, and objective measures of material self-interest are the least
important.8 Knowledge about the economy ranks somewhere in between:
sometimes it is important, sometimes not. To us, this does not paint a pic-
ture in which homo economicus is in charge.
Our evidence comes from a unique, new telephone survey of a random
sample of the U.S. population age eighteen and older. We begin by setting
up a recursive model of the formulation of public opinion. Next we
explain the survey that we designed and implemented and discuss some of
the speciﬁc questions.9 The two lengthy sections that follow make up
most of the paper. The ﬁrst discusses some of the more interesting tabula-
tions and cross-tabulations of the data; these are the straight facts. The
second presents estimates of our econometric model of public opinion.
We conclude with some overarching, although admittedly speculative,
interpretations of our ﬁndings.
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8. Our ﬁndings are consistent with Citrin and Green’s (1990, pp. 16–17) survey of the
political science literature, which concludes, “Taken as a group, the studies summarized
above appear devastating for the claim that self-interest, deﬁned narrowly as the pursuit of
immediate material beneﬁts, is the central motive underlying American public opinion. . . .
When self-interest effects did appear, they generally were weaker than the inﬂuence of
alternative sources of opinions such as values, feelings of group solidarity or ideology.”
9. We do not include the survey instrument here because it is long (over forty pages)
and somewhat hard to read owing to complexities in the skip pattern. It is available, along
with additional descriptive statistics, under “Economic Issues Survey” on the website of the
Princeton Survey Research Center at www.wws.princeton.edu/~psrc/surveys.html.
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To formulate an estimable model of how public opinion on economic
policy issues is formed, we work backward. To the extent that the process
is rational at the individual level, a person’s position on an issue should
depend on her self-interest, her ideology or “values,” her factual knowl-
edge and conceptual understanding of the issue, and the degree to which
she bases her decision on self-interest rather than her perception of what
is in the public interest.10 The last of these is likely the hardest to measure,
even by asking people. Our basic model is
where OP is the opinion of person i at the time of the survey, SI is self-
interest, ID is ideology, K is knowledge, ED is education, X is a vector of
other “demographic” variables such as race, sex, age, and income, and e1i
is an error term. (There might well be lags in this process, but we have no
time-series information.)
Our survey elicits some information about each respondent’s ideology
and self-interest. But we make no attempt to explain how any particular
person’s values and ideology were formed, or why his or her self-interest
is what it is. We simply treat these variables as econometrically exoge-
nous. (For example, one of our “self-interest” variables is income, but we
make no attempt to explain family income.) Our main focus is on the
acquisition of information, where the survey probed much more deeply.
The amount and kind of knowledge a person has on any particular eco-
nomic issue ought to depend on the costs and beneﬁts of acquiring such
knowledge. Our survey was thus designed not only to measure how well
informed respondents are, but also how and where they get their informa-
tion. Thus,
where D is a survey measure of how strongly the respondent desires to be
informed about the economy and economic policy, S is a vector repre-
senting the sources of information that the individual uses, and Q is an
() ( , , , , ) , 2 2 KE D D S Q X e ii i i i i i =+ g
() ( , , , , ) , 1 1 OP SI ID K ED X e ii i i i i i =+ f
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10. See Zaller (1992) for an alternative, although related, framework for how individu-
als acquire and transform information into responses to public opinion questions. Unlike
ours, Zaller’s model does not start by assuming rationality.
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deﬁned in the next section.
Finally, we try to explain why people do or do not choose to inform
themselves, and in what ways:
So, and now working forward from “causes” to “effects,” our model says
that people’s education, desire to be informed, self-interest, and ideology
combine to determine how much information—and what kinds of infor-
mation—they acquire (equations 3, 4, and 5). This information, along
with their education and desire to be informed, determines their knowl-
edge of an issue (equation 2). And this knowledge, along with their ideol-
ogy and self-interest, determines their opinions (equation 1). We pay
closest attention to equations 1, 2, and 3: (in reverse order) how people
inform themselves, the determinants of knowledge, and the determinants
of mass public opinion. 
The Survey
In the spring of 2003 we conducted a telephone survey of a random
sample of the U.S. population eighteen and older, using random-digit
dialing.11 As is typical for surveys of this type, the response rate (calcu-
lated according to American Association of Public Opinion Research
guidelines) was low: just 26 percent of working residential numbers. But,
perhaps surprisingly, the available evidence does not suggest that such
low response rates lead to major statistical biases.12 We completed 1,002
interviews and then weighted the responses to match the March 2002 pop-
() ( , , , ) . 5 3 5 DE D S I I D X e ii i i i i =+ h
() ( , , , , ) 4 24 Q ED D SI ID X e ii i i i i i =+ h
() ( , , , , ) 3 13 S ED D SI ID X e ii i i i i i =+ h
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11. The survey was conducted by Princeton University’s Survey Research Center. The
interviews began on March 28 and ended on June 3. In the case of “no answers,” the survey
protocols called for up to eight callbacks. It has been suggested to us that mentioning
Princeton University might have affected the response rates. But the sample did not appear
exceptional in terms of education, age, or other objective attributes.
12. See, for example, Keeter and others (2000).
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(CPS) in the following ﬁve respects: race, age, sex, education, and geo-
graphical region.13 All the results reported in this paper reﬂect that
weighting.
The survey, which typically took twelve to seventeen minutes to
administer, began with a series of questions about economic policy issues,
some of which are factual and some of which solicit the respondent’s
opinion. An example of the former is
“Roughly what size (in billions of dollars) is this year’s federal budget deﬁcit?”
An example of the latter is
“Do you think the federal budget deﬁcit ought to be reduced?”
The ﬁve policy issues we dealt with are taxes, the federal budget deﬁcit,
the minimum wage, Social Security, and health insurance. Each issue
involves several questions. In some cases (detailed below), the ordering
of the questions was randomized. But the ordering rarely mattered.
After thus giving people an idea of the sort of economic policy issues
in which we were interested, the survey went on to inquire about how they
become informed about such issues. The transition question to that part of
the survey was
“Next, we’d like to know how important it is to you to keep well informed
about major economic policy issues, such as the ones we have just been dis-
cussing. Would you say it is extremely important, very important, somewhat
important, not very important, or not important at all?” (emphasis added)
The answers to this question comprise the “desire to be informed” vari-
able, Di, in equations 3, 4, and 5. Notice the deliberate framing of what
we mean by “major economic policy issues.”
That initial question about the importance of information was followed
by a series of inquiries into “the sources of information you use, either to
learn about economic issues or to learn the opinions of others on these
issues.” One prototypical example is
“Do you watch television regularly, occasionally, or not at all to learn about
economic issues?”
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13. Without this weighting, women, senior citizens, the college educated, and non-
Hispanic whites would all have been overrepresented. The weights for each observation are
derived from an iterative procedure that balances the ﬁve variables. Thus we do not match
the CPS counts exactly.
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newspapers, magazines, books, statements by political leaders, statements
by business leaders, statements by economists, statements by civic or reli-
gious leaders, discussions with friends and relatives, and the Internet (in
that order). Most people presumably encounter statements by political
leaders, business leaders, or economists via one of the standard media
channels (such as television or newspapers). But, in our judgment, infor-
mation from these three groups of “experts” was sufﬁciently different
from the standard media fare that they merited inclusion on their own.
The ﬁnal section of the survey collected data on individual characteris-
tics, including the usual demographic variables (such as race, age, and
sex), but also including several less standard variables that relate to the
ﬁve policy issues, such as income, whether the person reported voting in
the 2000 election, whether the respondent was covered by health insur-
ance, and whether the respondent’s parents were alive.
Some Straight Facts
There are no well-accepted models of the phenomena we are studying,
the directions of causation among the variables we have collected are not
always obvious (and in some cases causation is clearly bidirectional), and
we have a paucity of truly exogenous variables (race, sex, and age being
the only unexceptionable ones). Valid objections can therefore surely be
raised against any identifying assumptions we might propose in formulat-
ing a regression model, such as the recursive structure we impose.
Undaunted, we will nonetheless do so when we estimate econometric
models later. But before jumping into such controversial waters, we ﬁrst
provide an exploratory analysis of the data without imposing any structure
on them.
The Demand for Economic Information
We begin with the desire to be informed, the variable D in the model.
Almost 24 percent of respondents said it was “extremely important” to
keep well informed about major economic policy issues, and just over
50 percent said it was “very important.” Another 23.5 percent character-
ized keeping well informed as “somewhat important,” leaving fewer than
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all” categories. Frankly, we were surprised—and pleased—by the
strength of the expressed desire to be informed.14
When we look across subgroups of the population, the answers to this
question do not vary signiﬁcantly (at the 5 percent level) by race, sex,
education, or income. But older respondents expressed a slightly stronger
desire to be well informed. We also divided the sample into those who
were working at the time of the survey (56 percent of the sample) and
those who were not. The working population turned out to have a slightly
weaker desire to be informed than the heterogeneous nonworking group,
which includes the unemployed, retirees, homemakers, and students.
In a survey that inquires about information relevant to economic policy
issues, we expected to ﬁnd many systematic differences by political ideol-
ogy. So respondents were asked to classify themselves as liberal (15 per-
cent of our sample), conservative (29 percent), moderate (19 percent),
other (4 percent), or “haven’t thought much about it” (33 percent). As
shorthand, we refer to the last group—the largest—as the “nonpoliticals.”
Using all ﬁve categories in a χ2 test of independence, we ﬁnd little evi-
dence of differences by ideology in the desire to be informed (χ2 = 28.6,
p = 0.133). 
However, we do ﬁnd rather strong differences with respect to a vari-
able that might be called “political engagement” (rather than partisan-
ship). We asked respondents whether they had voted in the 2000
presidential election. The answers to this question do not accurately rep-
resent actual voting behavior, since 68 percent of our respondents claimed
to have voted, whereas the national data show that only 51 percent of the
voting-age population actually did vote.15 The data may instead indicate
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14. The interviewers’ script began, “Hi. My name is _____, and I’m calling from
Princeton University to conduct a ﬁfteen-minute survey about economics and access to
economic information.” Given this preface, perhaps respondents believed they should
express a desire to be informed. On the other hand, the question about desire to be informed
came after a series of daunting questions on policy issues, which may have deﬂated some
respondents’ beliefs about how well informed they actually were.
15. See the Federal Election Commission data at www.fec.gov/pages/2000turnout/
reg&to00.htm. If our sample is representative, and voters accurately reported that they
voted, our ﬁnding implies that 34.7 percent (0.17 × 0.49 × 100) of nonvoters reported vot-
ing. This ﬁgure is a bit higher than found in surveys for earlier elections, but very close to
the overreporting of voting found for the 2000 election. Silver, Anderson, and Abramson
(1986) ﬁnd that 27.4 percent of nonvoters reported voting in 1964, 31.4 percent in 1976,
and 27.4 percent in 1980. The self-reported voting rate in the 2000 election based on the 
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actually voted). In any case the self-described “voters” were considerably
and signiﬁcantly (χ2 = 26.0, p = 0.001) more interested in keeping
informed than were the nonvoters. Fully 78 percent of “voters” said keep-
ing well informed was either extremely or very important to them, versus
only 66 percent of nonvoters. This strong correlation supports our view
that self-professed voting is an indicator of political engagement. As fur-
ther support of the notion that the “nonpoliticals” are disengaged, we note
that only 47 percent of them reported having voted in 2000, versus 79 per-
cent of everyone else.
Multiple regression estimates of equation 5 were not very informative,
however, and hence are not reported. We began by estimating an ordered
probit model using the three regressors suggested by the simple correla-
tions: age, working status, and whether the individual claimed to have
voted. Only the last of these was signiﬁcant. We then experimented with a
variety of demographic, ideology, and self-interest variables, as per equa-
tion 5, but found hardly any other signiﬁcant regressors. In a word, our
ability to predict a person’s desire to be informed based on measurable
variables is negligible. 
The next survey question asked each respondent who said that being
informed was at least “somewhat important” to state “the main reasons
why you wish to be well informed.” The choices listed were the ﬁve
shown in table 1 (respondents could choose more than one reason). Just
over half of our respondents gave the last response, which might be called
the “civics class” answer. But, perhaps inconsistently, only 22 percent
offered politics or voting as a reason. Slightly more than half mentioned
the relevance of economic issues to their personal ﬁnances. But, in a big
surprise to us, only 4 percent speciﬁcally mentioned the stock market as a
reason for wanting to keep informed. 
Do these answers vary by personal characteristics? The only general
answer, derived from the results below, is “somewhat.” 
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National Election Survey, which includes citizens only, exceeded the actual voting rate of
citizens by 17 percentage points (McDonald, 2003), the same as in our data. The voting rate
of citizens in 2000 was 55 percent, which implies that 39 percent of citizens who did not
vote reported that they had voted, slightly higher than the rate for all respondents (citizens
and noncitizens) in our sample. Note also that some respondents would not have been old
enough to vote in 2000. When those under 21 are omitted from the sample, the share claim-
ing to have voted rises to 72 percent.
2259-04-Blinder.qxd    8/6/04    11:20    Page  335demographics. Differences by age, sex, and race were generally
minor. The only notable ones were that older people were slightly more
likely to list the last response shown in table 1 (59 percent versus 51 per-
cent of younger people, p = 0.043),16 and that men were more likely than
women to say that being informed might be politically important or affect
their vote (26 percent versus 19 percent, p = 0.010). Because racial differ-
ences are so ubiquitous in cross-sectional work, we were surprised to ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant racial differences in the professed reasons for desiring to be
well informed.
economic status. Differences by education, employment status, and
income were more notable. For example, college-educated people were
substantially more likely than others to list the following three reasons for
wanting to be informed: the relevance of economic information for poli-
tics or their vote (mentioned by 35 percent of the college educated versus
17 percent of others, p = 0.000), the relevance to their business or profes-
sion (10 percent versus 6 percent, p = 0.008), and the relevance to per-
sonal ﬁnances (60 percent versus 51 percent, p = 0.018). Not surprisingly,
employed people were much more likely (10 percent versus 3 percent of
nonemployed, p = 0.000) to mention their job or profession as a reason for
wanting to keep informed about the economy. And differences by income
class were pervasive.17 Compared with lower-income people, higher-
income people were more likely to mention their personal ﬁnances
(59 percent versus 48 percent, p = 0.005), the relevance to their business
336 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
16. Since the mean and median ages in our sample are both approximately forty-ﬁve,
we divided our sample into “younger” and “older” subsamples at that age.
17. For these χ2 tests, we divided the sample at the $40,000 mark, which is close to the
median; 45 percent of the sample reported a household income of $40,000 or less. The next
income bracket was $40,000 to $60,000.
Table 1. Reasons Given for Wanting to be Informed about Economic Policya
Reason Percent of respondents
Affects personal ﬁnances 54
Affects business or profession 7
Relevant to stock market, investments 4
Economic issues are important politically; might affect my vote 22
To be a responsible citizen; just like to keep informed 55
Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
a. Numbers sum to more than 100 percent because respondents could offer more than one answer. 
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to politics and voting (26 percent versus 18 percent, p = 0.025), but less
likely to mention their general desire to be well-informed (50 percent ver-
sus 62 percent, p = 0.004).
political involvement. Respondents of different political ideolo-
gies differed only in how often they mentioned politics or voting as a rea-
son for keeping informed. However, this difference appears to be more a
matter of detachment than of ideology: nonpoliticals were substantially
less likely to cite politics (only 8 percent did so) than either liberals
(27 percent), conservatives (28 percent), or moderates (31 percent).
Across these four categories, the χ2 test of independence is highly signiﬁ-
cant (χ2 = 52.4, p = 0.000). Consistent with this, self-described voters
were much more likely than nonvoters to cite politics or voting as a rea-
son to keep informed (27 percent versus 12 percent, p = 0.000).
The Sources of Economic Information
The lengthiest part of the questionnaire inquired about the sources of
information people use to inform themselves. As mentioned in the previ-
ous section, we asked about the frequency of use of each of eleven possi-
ble sources of information about economic issues, and we coded the
responses as either “regularly or often,” “occasionally,” or “rarely or
never.” Table 2 ranks the eleven sources from the most frequently used
(television) to the least (books). It is hardly surprising that television is the
most popular source of information—which it is by a substantial margin. 
We followed this question by asking respondents whether they “learn
more about economics from the networks, from cable, or about the same
from both,” with the following results:
Network stations  17 percent
Cable stations  28 percent
About the same  44 percent.
Although it reaches many fewer viewers, cable has a noticeable edge.
Nor is it surprising that newspapers rank second as a source of eco-
nomic information. But we would not have predicted that more people
(54 percent) get their economic information from local newspapers than
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or from any other “big city” newspaper (19 percent).18 Remember, we
preconditioned this response by ﬁrst asking questions about national
issues like the federal budget deﬁcit and Social Security, not about the
local school budget or personal ﬁnance. Finally, we inquired about which
sections of the newspaper people “turn to, to learn about the economy or
economic policy.” The business and ﬁnancial (43 percent) and national
news (39 percent) sections received the most votes, with the editorial
page (including op-eds) lagging far behind (9 percent).
When we peer below ﬁrst and second place in table 2, our priors on the
rankings were pretty diffuse. “Discussions with friends and relatives”
ranked third, narrowly edging out “statements by political leaders.” We
were somewhat surprised to learn that radio is used so little, and we were
quite surprised by the minimal use of magazines. (This includes the mass-
circulation magazines like Time and Newsweek.) But we were gratiﬁed to
ﬁnd “statements by economists” ranking right in the middle of the eleven
338 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
18. The six national publications were the New York Times, the Washington Post, the
Wall Street Journal, USA Today, the  Financial Times, and Investors’ Business Daily.
Examples of “other big-city newspapers” were the Boston Globe and the San Francisco
Chronicle. Coding of “national,” “big city,” and “local” newspapers was done by the sur-
vey takers, not by the respondents.
Table 2. Sources of Information about Economic Policy by Frequency of Use a
Percent of sample
Source Regularly or often Occasionally  Rarely or never
Television 61 30 9
Newspapers 49 26 25
Friends or relatives 35 42 22
Political leadersb 35 40 25
Radio 26 23 50
Economistsb 17 36 46
Internet 21 18 61
Business leadersb 12 31 57
Civic or religious leaders 10 27 62
Magazines 12 21 67
Books 7 14 79
Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
a. Numbers for each source may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding.
b. Information from these sources presumably is communicated via one or more of the other eight sources.
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leaders, magazines, and books.20 Finally, table 2 probably underestimates
the dominance of television, because many people probably hear the
views of political leaders, economists, and business leaders on television,
although some of this information also comes from radio, magazines, the
Internet, and newspapers, of course.
We concluded the section on sources of information by reading back to
each respondent the list of sources he or she had reported using “regularly
or often” and then asking, “which . . . is your most important source of
information on economics or economic policy?” By this alternative crite-
rion, the ranking of sources is rather different (table 3). Television and
newspapers still rank ﬁrst and second, respectively, but the margin for
television is now enormous. After that, the rankings in table 3 differ
noticeably from those in table 2. For example, the Internet ranks much
higher and, alas, economists rank much lower. Overall, the rank correla-
tion between tables 2 and 3 is 0.76.
In a word, television tops the list of sources from which our respon-
dents get their economic information; everything else lags well behind.
But not all people are alike. As we did with the reasons for desiring to be
informed, we next looked for statistically signiﬁcant (at the 5 percent
level) differences in the frequency of use of the sources of information by
demographics, economic status, and political engagement. There were
many, so we summarize them brieﬂy.
demographics. Our χ2 tests show that older respondents made signif-
icantly greater use of most, but not all, sources of information. But
younger respondents used radio and the Internet more. Men reported mak-
ing greater use of radio, business leaders, economists, and the Internet,
whereas women reported greater use of civic or religious leaders. Racial
differences were less common: whites used television more, and non-
whites used magazines, books, and civic and religious leaders more.
education and economic status. We found signiﬁcant differences
by respondent’s level of education in the use of six of the eleven sources:
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19. About one-sixth of the people who said they learn about the economy from econo-
mists “regularly” or “occasionally” speciﬁcally mentioned Alan Greenspan as the econo-
mist. We did not prompt that response.
20. Where the rankings of the distributions shown in table 2 were ambiguous, we
broke the tie by assigning point scores as follows: regularly or often = 3, occasionally = 2,
rarely = 1.
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Internet. In each case, college-educated people reported using the infor-
mation source more. Similarly, higher-income respondents made signiﬁ-
cantly greater use of six sources: newspapers, radio, the Internet, political
leaders, business leaders, and economists. Lower-income people used
only one information source, statements by civic or religious leaders,
more intensely than did higher-income people. Differences by employ-
ment status were less common; nonemployed people reported using
books and the Internet more.
ideology and political involvement. Although we found signiﬁ-
cant differences in information use by “ideology” in eight of the eleven
cases, the differences did not typically cut across liberal-conservative
lines. As a broad generalization, it was the nonpolitical group that stood
apart from the rest by making less use of information. Similarly, for eight
of the eleven sources, self-described voters were more likely to use the
source than nonvoters. 
Although the types of media used by liberals and conservatives are
similar, we do ﬁnd ideological differences in the particular newspapers
that individuals choose to read. Table 4 shows, for each of the major
newspapers as well as big-city and local papers, the proportion of people,
classiﬁed by self-identiﬁed ideology, who obtain information about the
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Table 3. Sources of Information about Economic Policy by Order of Importancea
Percent of sample
Share of respondents 






Friends and relatives 6.6
Political leaders 2.3
Magazines 2.2




Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
a. Numbers do not sum to 100 percent because of rounding.
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likely than conservatives to read the New York Times, and conservatives
are twice as likely as liberals to read the Wall Street Journal. But we did
not ﬁnd any ideological divide in the use of cable stations versus network
television.22
Finally, for use as empirical counterparts to the theoretical variable Q
(quantity of information) in equation 2, we constructed two measures of
how intensively each respondent used the various sources of information.
Remember, each person was asked how often he or she used each source.
Let s1, s2, and s3 be, respectively, the number of sources a respondent
reported using “regularly or often,” “occasionally,” and “rarely or never,”
and let the total number of sources, s, equal s1 + s2 + s3. (Note that s can be
less than eleven because of item nonresponse.) Then deﬁne QH (“quantity
high”) and QL (“quantity low”) as, respectively, s1/s and s3/s. QH and QL
thus measure intensity of information use and lack of intensity, respec-
tively. Because not all sources of information convey equal quantities of
information, our measures are undoubtedly crude proxies, but they are
probably still correlated with the extent to which individuals access infor-
mation about the economy. 
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21. These numbers need not, and do not, mirror published circulation ﬁgures. For
example, almost as many people report learning about the economy from the New York
Times (8.2 percent) as from the Wall Street Journal (8.7 percent), even though the Jour-
nal’s (weekday) circulation is almost double that of the Times.
22. See Hamilton (2003) for an analysis of trends in “media bias” and the impact of
competition on partisan news reporting.




Newspaper Liberal Conservative Moderate thought about it p valueb
New York Times 23 3 9 2 0.000
Wall Street Journal 5 10 9 3 0.001
Washington Post 6 1 1 0 0.000
USA Today 8 7 12 4 0.013
Other big-city paper 25 25 18 14 0.002
Local paper 44 55 56 56 0.066
Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
a. Columns may sum to more or less than 100 percent because respondents could offer more than one answer or no answer. 
b. Probability that a constant proportion of respondents of all ideologies use the indicated source.
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shown in table 5. Not surprisingly, the frequency distribution of QH (high
intensity) is piled up at the low end: just 15 percent of respondents have a
QH greater than 0.4, whereas 32 percent have a QH below 0.1. “Heavy”
users of information are thus relatively rare. Perhaps more surprisingly,
the distribution of the variable QL (low intensity) is not piled up at the
high end: fewer than 14 percent of respondents have a QL above 0.7,
whereas 73 percent have a QL between 0.2 and 0.7. This is rather more use
of information than we might have expected.
Looking across personal characteristics, we found some of the empiri-
cal regularities that one might expect. College-educated people, high-
income people, and self-professed voters reported signiﬁcantly more
intensive use of information sources. Compared with either liberals, con-
servatives, or moderates, the nonpoliticals had signiﬁcantly lower QH and
signiﬁcantly higher QL. All these differences are signiﬁcant well beyond
the 0.1 percent level. The other personal characteristics—age, race, sex,
and employment status—did not seem to matter much.23
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23. There were two minor exceptions. Whites had slightly higher average values of QL
than nonwhites, and the employed had lower QL than the nonemployed.
Table 5. Frequency Distribution of High- and Low-Intensity Users 
of Information Sourcesa
Percent of respondents with QH (high intensity of 
information use) or QL (low intensity) 
in indicated range
Range  QH QL
0.0 ≤ Q < 0.1 32.0 5.5
0.1 ≤ Q < 0.2 19.6 7.6
0.2 ≤ Q < 0.3 20.5 11.4
0.3 ≤ Q < 0.4 13.2 16.5
0.4 ≤ Q < 0.5 7.0 17.9
0.5 ≤ Q < 0.6 3.9 15.1
0.6 ≤ Q < 0.7 2.5 12.4
0.7 ≤ Q < 0.8 0.9 7.5
0.8 ≤ Q < 0.9 0.4 4.2
0.9 ≤ Q < 1.0 0.03 1.9
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the survey described in the text.
a. QH is calculated as s1/(s1 + s2 + s3), and QL as s3/(s1 + s2 + s3), where s1, s2, and s3 are the numbers of information sources that
the respondent uses “regularly or often,” “occasionally,” and “rarely or never,” respectively. QH and QL thus range from 0 to 1,
with a higher QH indicating greater intensity of use of the identiﬁed sources generally, and a higher QL less intensity.
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In the context of asking a series of questions about the ﬁve economic
policy issues, we embedded nine “fact” questions whose purpose was to
assess each respondent’s knowledge. The facts inquired about were
—the share of income that a typical family pays in taxes 
—whether most people pay more in payroll or in income taxes
—the size of the federal budget deﬁcit
—the level of the federal minimum wage
—the size of the average Social Security beneﬁt check
—whether the respondent knew that President Bush had proposed par-
tial privatization of Social Security
—whether the respondent knew that the Social Security system is pro-
jected to start running deﬁcits in about a decade
—whether Medicare covered prescription drugs for outpatients (at the
time of the survey)
—the percentage of Americans who do not have health insurance.
As a broad generalization and with exceptions to be noted shortly, we
were surprised to ﬁnd that the average responses to most of these ques-
tions were roughly correct (although the standard deviations were often
huge). With one important exception—the federal budget deﬁcit—there
was also hardly any indication of skewness: the mean and median
responses were close. Table 6 compares the correct answers to these fact
questions with the survey results. Several comments are in order.
The correct tax share is a difﬁcult question conceptually. Most econo-
mists think ﬁrst of taxes as a share of GDP, which was 28.4 percent in
2002. But the denominator of this ratio (GDP) is meaningless to most
people, and the numerator includes many taxes that people probably do
not think of themselves as paying.24 So we posed a more user-friendly
version of the question:
“About what percentage of the typical American family’s income do you think
goes to paying taxes—including all levels of government?”
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24. Two prominent examples are the corporate income tax and the employer’s share of
the payroll tax. This example illustrates a general and important point about public opinion
polling. Economists often want to see survey questions that make sense to them. Such ques-
tions may involve complicated concepts and numerous provisos that leave ordinary people
confused. Good poll questions need to be understandable by ordinary people with limited
attention spans and no training in economics.
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employee’s share of the payroll tax to personal income as deﬁned in the
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). For the numerator we
included personal income taxes, estate and gift taxes, the employee’s
share of the payroll tax, almost all sales and excise taxes, and property
taxes on owner-occupied housing—all from the NIPA. But we excluded
corporate income taxes, the employer’s share of the payroll tax, property
taxes on rental housing, customs duties, and the excise tax on diesel fuel
on the grounds that individuals are unlikely to think of themselves as pay-
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Table 6. Correct Answers to Factual Questions in the Survey and Answers 
Given by Respondents
Survey Survey Survey
Correct mean standard median
Question answer answer deviation answer
What percentage of its income does the 
typical American family pay in taxes? 23.3a 31.3 15.6 30
Do most Americans pay more in 
income or in payroll taxes? Payrollb Incomec … Income
How large is the current federal budget 
deﬁcit? (in billions of dollars) 246–310d 334 739 90
What is the current federal minimum 
wage? (in dollars) 5.15 5.86 1.27 5.65
How much is the average Social Security 
beneﬁt check? (in dollars) 898 824 493 800
Did you know that President Bush has 
proposed partial privatization of 
Social Security? … Yese … Yes
Did you know that Social Security is 
projected to begin running deﬁcits in 
about a decade? … Yesf … Yes
Does Medicare cover prescription drugs 
for outpatients? Nog Noh …N o
What percentage of Americans do not 
have health insurance? 15 37 16.7 35
Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
a. Calculated as personal income taxes, estate and gift taxes, the employee’s share of the payroll tax, most sales and excise
taxes, and property taxes on owner-occupied housing, summed and divided by personal income plus the employee share of the
payroll tax.
b. When the employer share of the payroll tax is included, 83 percent of taxpayers pay more in payroll than in income tax;
when it is excluded, the ﬁgure is 53 percent, according to Gale and Rohaly (2003). 
c. Response given by 52 percent of respondents.
d. The lower and upper bounds on this range were, approximately, the ofﬁcial estimates published by the Congressional Bud-
get Ofﬁce on March 10 and May 9, 2003, respectively.
e. Response given by 56 percent of respondents
f. Response given by 69 percent of respondents.
g. A Medicare prescription drug beneﬁt was enacted in December 2003, after the survey was taken.
h. Response given by 54 percent of respondents (after excluding the 11 percent who did not answer the question).
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the share of the median family would be a bit lower. Thus we were left
with two alternative interpretations of the mean survey response of
31.3 percent: it was either a small overestimate of the tax share of GDP or
a substantial overestimate of our constructed tax share. We favor the lat-
ter interpretation. Note also that the standard deviation across respondents
was very large: more than 15 percentage points.
About 53 percent of tax ﬁlers with wage income pay more in payroll
taxes than they do in income taxes.25 But our respondents, by a decisive
margin of 52 percent to 35 percent, thought the reverse was true—that a
majority of taxpayers pay more in income taxes than in payroll taxes.26
Estimates of the federal budget deﬁcit—whether for ﬁscal 2003 or
2004—were rising sharply while our survey was in the ﬁeld. We therefore
decided to count any number between $246 billion and $310 billion as
correct; these were the ofﬁcial estimates published by the Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) on March 10, 2003, and May 9, 2003, respec-
tively.27 In fact, the mean estimate in the survey ($334 billion) was amaz-
ingly accurate, especially since private sector estimates at the time were
running well above the CBO’s estimates. However, the variance across
respondents was truly astounding—we received estimates of the federal
budget deﬁcit as low as $1 billion and as high as $5 trillion. The median
response—just $90 billion—also showed that the “typical” response was
far too low.28
The average (and the median) estimate of the federal minimum wage
was also quite accurate, especially when one considers that some respon-
dents may have given the higher state minimum wage instead (as some
explicitly did).29
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25. See Gale and Rohaly (2003). The 53 percent ﬁgure includes just the employee com-
ponent of the payroll tax. If both the employer and the employee shares are considered,
83 percent of wage earners pay more in payroll taxes than in income taxes.
26. The remaining 13 percent said they did not know or thought they were about the
same. Bartels (2003, p. 19) reports results from an NPR/Kaiser Foundation/Kennedy
School survey that found that people are even more inaccurate in assessing whether they
themselves pay more in income or in payroll taxes. To us, this suggests that many people
simply do not distinguish between income and payroll taxes.
27. The May 9 CBO estimate was actually “over $300 billion.”
28. The rate of nonresponse was also quite high on this question, at about 48 percent,
suggesting that there was even less knowledge than the reported estimates indicate.
29. When we compute errors below, we use the state minimum wage as the true value
if a respondent mentioned that he or she was reporting the state minimum wage.
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in the survey, although the variance was again enormous, and fully
18 percent of respondents were unable to answer the question. Similarly,
majorities of respondents said they were aware “that President Bush has
proposed that part of Social Security be replaced by personal investment
accounts” and “that the Social Security system is projected to start run-
ning deﬁcits about a decade from now.” In general, public knowledge of
the Social Security system seemed pretty high.
Not so for health insurance, however. A bare majority (54 percent) of
those who answered the question realized that Medicare did not, at the
time of the survey, cover prescription drugs “when people are not in
the hospital”—this despite an avalanche of recent public attention to the
issue.30 And perhaps the greatest misconception in the survey was
the belief that a stunning 37 percent (this was the mean response) “of
Americans do not have any health insurance today.” The actual number
in 2002 was 15.2 percent. 
Each of the nine “knowledge” questions above will be used in context
later, when we study public opinion on speciﬁc policy issues. But we also
constructed a generic knowledge score—corresponding to the variable
K in our model—as follows. Five of the questions have numerical
answers. For each of these we computed the absolute error and then
assigned each respondent a percentile rank based on accuracy, Pij, where
i indexes individuals and j indexes questions. We also assigned numerical
scores to two qualitative questions (those on payroll versus income tax
and on Medicare drug coverage), setting the values for the various
answers so that the mean score was the 50th percentile (just like the
numerical questions) and the standard deviation approximated that of a
uniform distribution (σ = 28.9 percent). However, in computing our com-
posite knowledge score, we gave only 50 percent weight to these two
questions because it was easier to guess the correct answer. We excluded
the two Social Security questions that began “Are you aware that. . .” on
the grounds that the phrasing probably often “led the witness” to the cor-
rect answers. We then summed these ranks across all the (weighted) ques-
tions the respondent answered to obtain Ki = (1/6) Σj Pij. Note that we
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30. The 54-46 split excludes the 11 percent of respondents who did not answer the
question.
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questions exactly as they would be treated on an exam: they get zero
points. Strikingly, the distribution of our constructed knowledge variable
across the population of respondents closely resembles a normal distribu-
tion, with a mean of 42.9 and a standard deviation of 16.7 (ﬁgure 1).
How does economic knowledge, thus measured, vary by personal char-
acteristics, by the desire to keep informed, by the main sources of infor-
mation, and by the number of information sources an individual uses? The
rest of this subsection explores various dimensions of this question.
personal characteristics. There were no signiﬁcant differences in
mean knowledge score by age, and only minor differences by sex and
race. Larger and more highly signiﬁcant differences (all have p values
Alan S. Blinder and Alan B. Krueger 347
31. About half the sample was not asked for their estimate of the budget deﬁcit. For
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Figure 1. Distribution of Knowledge Scores
Source: Authors’ survey described in text.
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involvement:
—Higher-income people outscored lower-income people on our test by
an average of 8.6 points (0.51σ). The scores of college-educated respon-
dents averaged 6.3 points (0.38σ) higher than the scores of non-college-
educated respondents. This is far smaller than the gap of 0.9σ recorded on
the 1994 U.S. International Adult Literacy Survey; the difference is prob-
ably due to the fact that our assessment is based on just seven questions
and the results are therefore noisy.32
—Once again, the nonpolitical group stood out from the rest, with
unusually low scores (about 6 or 7 points lower than liberals, conserva-
tives, or moderates), and self-reported voters scored 8.5 points higher, on
average, than nonvoters.33
differences by desire to keep informed. It seems almost axio-
matic that individuals who deem it more important to keep informed
should actually be better informed. But the knowledge scores do not
really bear this out, except for the lowest category (table 7). Although the
ordering is as expected, the null hypothesis that all four mean scores are
equal cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level (p = 0.07).
differences by major source of information. Table 8 shows that
the small number of people who said that magazines are their primary
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32. As another point of comparison, Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (forthcoming) ﬁnd
that scores on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test rise by 0.17 standard deviation for each
year of schooling. The difference in years of schooling between college graduates and non-
graduates is 4.5, so this amounts to a 0.77σ gap, or twice what we ﬁnd for our test.
33. This result is consistent with Palfrey and Poole’s (1987) results for political
knowledge.
Table 7. Respondents’ Knowledge Scores by Reported Desire to 
Keep Well Informed
Stated importance of  Mean knowledge Share of sample
keeping well informed score (percentile)a (percent)
Extremely important 43.8 23.8
Very important 43.3 50.2
Somewhat important 42.5 23.4
Not very important or  34.5 2.6
not important at all
Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
a. See the text for description of how the knowledge score was calculated.
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were the most knowledgeable group, with a mean K score of 52.7. The
even smaller number of people whose most important source of informa-
tion was statements by economists ranked second (mean K = 50.3). The
least knowledgeable people, by far, were the small group who rely most
on statements by civic and religious leaders (mean K = 35.0). Those
whose most important source was television—a plurality of the sample—
had a relatively low mean K score of 41.1.
differences by quantity of information. Table 9 displays a posi-
tive, but by no means high, correlation between the knowledge score and
the number of different sources that the respondent reports using regularly
or often. Thus more information does improve knowledge, albeit very
imperfectly. The null hypothesis that all the K scores are equal in table 9
is rejected at beyond the 0.1 percent level, but the relationship is not
monotonic. 
direction of errors. Our test scores are based on absolute errors,
without regard to sign. But it has been suggested that conservatives and
liberals may make systematically different errors because the two groups
seek out and utilize different sources of information in order to see their
beliefs conﬁrmed.34 Although conservatives and liberals had similar aver-
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Table 8. Respondents’ Knowledge Scores by Reported Most Important Source of
Economic Policy Informationa
Mean knowledge Share of sample









Political leaders 40.9  2.3
Friends and relatives 39.9 6.6
Civic or religious leaders 35.0 1.2
Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
a. Numbers do not sum to 100 percent because of rounding.
b. See the text for description of how the knowledge score was calculated.
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in the direction of their errors.
On average, conservatives thought that the federal budget deﬁcit was
much larger ($333 billion versus $177 billion), that Social Security bene-
ﬁts were a bit more generous ($873 versus $766 per month), and that a
smaller share of the U.S. population lacked health insurance (32 percent
versus 40 percent) than did liberals. Conservatives were also more likely
than liberals to report being aware that the Social Security trust fund is
projected to run a deﬁcit in about a decade (82 percent versus 74 percent)
and less likely to say that Medicare already provided coverage for pre-
scription drugs (23 percent versus 34 percent). Although each of these
differences is statistically signiﬁcant, it is hard—for us at least—to see
any clear pattern of ideological bias in these numbers. And on the other
policy questions—regarding the tax share of income, whether the payroll
tax is larger than the income tax, the value of the minimum wage, and
whether respondents were aware of the Bush Social Security proposal—
ideological differences were trivial and consistent with chance. 
Opinions on Economic Policy Issues
As stated earlier, the survey instrument began with a series of ques-
tions about people’s opinions on a variety of economic policy issues.
the tax burden and the bush tax cuts. The ﬁrst such question
was
“Do you think taxes in the United States are generally too high, too low, or
about right?”
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Table 9. Respondents’ Knowledge Scores by Reported Number of Sources Used
Regularly or Often
Mean knowledge Share of sample
No. of sources score (percentile) (percent)a






Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
a. Numbers do not sum to 100 percent because of rounding.
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fact question about the tax share. The ordering of the two questions turned
out not to affect the responses appreciably, and so we treated all the
responses as a single sample. Some 61 percent of respondents said that
taxes are too high, 36 percent said they are about right, 3 percent said they
are too low, and 2 percent said they did not know.
The overwhelming popular sentiment that taxes are too high can hardly
come as a shock to any sentient American. We have probably believed
this since the 1770s. But the cross-tabulations by subsets of the popula-
tion did hold some surprises. First, self-described conservatives (at
62 percent) were not much more likely than others (at 60 percent) to say
that taxes are too high. Liberals, however, were notably less likely—just
48 percent did so. The most antitax group turned out to be the disengaged
nonpoliticals, 70 percent of whom said taxes are too high. Second,
although racial differences were not terribly sharp, nonwhites (at 70 per-
cent) were more likely than whites (at 59 percent) to say that taxes are too
high (p = 0.036). Third, lower-income people were more likely than
higher-income people to say that taxes are too high (68 percent to 56 per-
cent, p = 0.001).35 Two other breakdowns were statistically signiﬁcant:
college-educated people were much less likely than others to say that
taxes are too high (51 percent versus 65 percent, p = 0.000), and
employed people were more likely than the nonemployed (65 percent ver-
sus 56 percent, p = 0.033) to have that opinion.
While our survey was in the ﬁeld, Congress was debating President
Bush’s 2003 tax proposal (which subsequently passed) to advance the
timing of the phased-in tax rate reductions enacted in 2001 and to estab-
lish a preferentially low tax rate on dividends. So we asked respondents
whether they favored or opposed this proposal, ordering this opinion
question (on a randomized basis) either before or after the fact question
about whether the typical American pays more in payroll or income taxes
(but always after the question about the typical family’s tax share). In this
case the answers did depend a bit on the ordering: asking the payroll tax
question ﬁrst reduced support for the Bush tax cut by about 5 percentage
points. But a χ2 test did not reject the null hypothesis of the independence
of responses and question order (p = 0.31).
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the utility loss from paying taxes may be proportionately greater for the poor.
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political ideology mattered quite strongly (p = 0.000). This time, conserv-
atives were far more supportive of the Bush proposal (64 percent) than
other groups (36 percent), even though, as just reported, they were no
more likely to deem taxes too high. Both college-educated people (by
35 percent versus 23 percent of the non-college-educated) and self-
reported voters (by 30 percent versus 19 percent of nonvoters) were more
likely to oppose the 2003 Bush tax cuts (p = 0.000 and p = 0.003, respec-
tively). And both whites (by a 46-to-33 percent margin) and higher-
income people (by 50 to 35 percent) were much more likely to favor them
(p = 0.000 in both cases). Finally, employed people favored the Bush tax
cuts more than nonemployed people did. There were no signiﬁcant differ-
ences by age or sex.
the federal budget deﬁcit. The next opinion question was
“How much of a problem do you think the federal budget deﬁcit poses for the
economy? Would you say it is not a problem at all, a minor problem, or a seri-
ous problem?”
We posed this question in two variants. For some respondents we asked it
after ﬁrst inquiring about the size of the deﬁcit. For others we asked it
after telling the respondent, “This year’s federal budget deﬁcit is approxi-
mately $300 billion. This works out to around $3,000 per household.”
Remember, the median estimate of those who were asked about the size
of the deﬁcit was only $90 billion. So giving the $300 billion ﬁgure
framed the deﬁcit at a higher level for most respondents. 
Telling respondents the actual size of the deﬁcit did have a marked
effect on their responses, as table 10 shows. But, oddly, doing so reduced
the fraction who thought the deﬁcit is a serious problem, by about 9 per-
centage points. However, the χ2 test for independence between order and
response categories was only marginally signiﬁcant (p = 0.06). 
We followed this question with two further queries about public policy
toward the deﬁcit:
“Do you think the federal budget deﬁcit ought to be reduced?”
and (for the 87.5 percent of the sample who answered “yes”)
“Do you think the deﬁcit should be reduced mostly by raising taxes, mostly by
cutting spending, or about equally by both means?”
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favored reducing the deﬁcit “mostly by cutting spending” (45 percent)
and those who favored doing so “about equally by both means” (47 per-
cent), with a tiny minority (3 percent) favoring “mostly by raising taxes.”
(The other 5 percent gave no coherent opinion.) Several differences
among subgroups were also observed.
Demographics. Older people and women were far more likely than
younger people and men to rate the deﬁcit “a serious problem,” and by
almost identical margins: 65 percent versus 50 percent (p = 0.000). But,
ironically and perhaps inconsistently, this belief did not make them more
likely to “think the federal budget deﬁcit ought to be reduced.” Nor were
there signiﬁcant sex or racial differences in the preferred cures for the
deﬁcit; however, older Americans favored expenditure cuts more than
younger Americans did. Finally, although whites worried less about the
budget deﬁcit than did nonwhites, they were nonetheless slightly more
likely to favor reducing the deﬁcit. 
Economic Status. The opinions of college-educated and non-college-
educated respondents did not differ signiﬁcantly on any of the three
deﬁcit-related questions. The same was true when we compared the
employed with the nonemployed. However, lower-income people were
considerably more likely than higher-income people to rate the deﬁcit a
serious problem (by 65 percent versus 53 percent, p = 0.012). That said,
income did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence opinion on either of the other two
deﬁcit-related questions.
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Table 10. Respondents’ Opinions on the Federal Budget Deﬁcita 
Percent 
Respondents told size 
of actual deﬁcitb
Opinion Yes No All respondents
Deﬁcit a serious problem 50 59 54
Deﬁcit a minor problem 38 33 36
Deﬁcit not a problem 5 3 4
Don’t know 6 5 5
Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
a. Numbers may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding.
b. Approximately half of respondents were told, “This year’s federal budget deﬁcit is approximately $300 billion. This works
out to around $3,000 per household.” The rest were not given this information. 
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quite a bit (p = 0.000). In a sign of these unusual times, liberals were far
more likely to rate the budget deﬁcit a serious problem (72 percent) than
either conservatives (44 percent) or nonpoliticals (56 percent).36 In this
respect moderates (at 67 percent) were closer to liberals. Yet, once again,
there were no signiﬁcant differences by ideology in the fraction of people
who  “think the federal budget deﬁcit ought to be reduced.” (Almost
everyone does.) Ideology showed through strongly again (p = 0.000),
however, when it came to selecting the preferred method for reducing the
deﬁcit: conservatives favored spending cuts over tax increases by a mar-
gin of 50 percent to 2 percent; among liberals the corresponding margin
was 39 percent to 12 percent. (The disengaged nonpolitical group were
like the conservatives in this respect. Moderates were in between.)
Finally, self-reported voters and nonvoters did not differ much on any of
the three deﬁcit-related questions.
the minimum wage. Our next query was straightforward:
“Do you think the federal minimum wage should be increased?”
The answers overwhelmingly favored a higher minimum wage:
Yes 75 percent
No 21 percent
Don’t know or refused 4 percent.
We posed this question either before or after asking people, on a random-
ized basis, what the current minimum wage is. But the ordering made no
difference. We also disaggregated the sample by personal characteristics,
with the following results. 
Demographics. There were no signiﬁcant differences in the answers to
this question by age or employment status. But women and nonwhites
were more likely to favor raising the minimum wage than men and
whites—by margins of 81 percent to 69 percent (p = 0.000) for women
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36. By contrast, an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll of 1,003 adults conducted in January
1995 found that 40 percent of conservatives identiﬁed the federal budget deﬁcit as the most
important economic issue facing the country, while only 23 percent of liberals did so. By a
wide margin, the deﬁcit was the issue most commonly cited by conservatives, but not by
liberals (38 percent of whom cited unemployment) See Roper Center, Public Opinion
Online Archive, University of Connecticut, Question ID USNBCWSJ.012095, R09A.
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whites.
Economic Status. College-educated people were less likely to favor a
higher minimum wage than the non-college-educated (66 percent versus
83 percent, p = 0.000). Perhaps they learned about the alleged disem-
ployment effects of the minimum wage in a college economics course!37
And, as one would expect, lower-income people favored raising it more
than higher-income people did (by a margin of 85 percent to 73 percent,
p = 0.001).
Political Involvement. Not surprisingly, attitudes toward the minimum
wage differed signiﬁcantly by political ideology (p = 0.000). Conserva-
tives, although still supportive (with 60 percent favoring), were far less
likely to favor raising it than were all other groups (which were in the 85
to 89 percent approval range). Self-reported voters were also less likely to
favor raising the minimum wage (74 percent versus 87 percent of nonvot-
ers, p = 0.000).
social security policy. In addition to the three fact questions men-
tioned above—pertaining to average Social Security beneﬁts, the actuar-
ial deﬁcit, and President Bush’s partial privatization plan—we asked two
policy questions about Social Security. First, immediately after asking,
“Are you aware that President Bush has proposed that part of Social Secu-
rity be replaced by personal investment accounts?” we posed the follow-
ing policy question:
“Do you favor or oppose this idea, or are you undecided?”
Second, right after asking, “Are you aware that the Social Security Sys-
tem is projected to start running deﬁcits about a decade from now?” we
inquired,
“Do you think the government should try to reduce those deﬁcits mainly by
raising the payroll tax, mainly by reducing Social Security beneﬁts, or both?”
Twenty percent of respondents favored partially replacing Social Secu-
rity with personal accounts, whereas 38 percent opposed the idea and
42 percent were undecided. As for closing the future Social Security
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37. The argument can be found in most beginning economics texts. For contrary evi-
dence, see Card and Krueger (1995). A survey by Fuller and Geide-Stevenson (2003) in fall
2000 found that 46 percent of members of the American Economic Association “mainly
agreed” that “Minimum wages increase unemployment among young and unskilled work-
ers.” Twenty-seven percent disagreed, and 28 percent agreed with provisos.
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favored a mixture of both remedies (34 percent) and those who favored
relying mainly on the payroll tax (30 percent). Only 5 percent wanted to
rely mainly on beneﬁt reductions, and a large 22 percent preferred neither
remedy. Interestingly, this expressed preference for higher taxes over
lower expenditure is just the reverse of what we found earlier, when we
inquired about ways to reduce the overall budget deﬁcit. Social Security,
it appears, really is different. Looking across subgroups yielded the fol-
lowing ﬁndings.
Demographics. There were no signiﬁcant racial differences on either
Social Security policy question. Men were much more likely than women
to favor partial privatization (28 percent versus 13 percent, p = 0.000),
and they were less likely to favor tax increases to reduce the Social Secu-
rity deﬁcit (28 percent versus 38 percent, p = 0.000). But the biggest dif-
ferences, as one would expect, came by age. Older people were much
more likely than younger ones to oppose the privatization idea (46 percent
versus 31 percent) and much less likely to be undecided (32 percent ver-
sus 50 percent). The curious consequence is that the proportion favoring
the idea was roughly independent of age (about 20 percent). When it came
to choosing between beneﬁt cuts and tax increases as alternative ways to
reduce the Social Security deﬁcit, older Americans were more likely than
younger ones (by 31 percent versus 18 percent) to choose “neither”—
even though that option was not offered. Younger Americans were more
likely (45 percent versus 29 percent) to opt for “both.” Both sets of differ-
ences are highly signiﬁcant.
Economic Status. Higher-income people were much more likely to
favor privatization (27 percent versus 12 percent of lower-income people,
p = 0.000), as were the employed (24 percent versus 15 percent of the
nonemployed, p = 0.007) and the college-educated (33 percent versus
16 percent of the non-college-educated, p = 0.000). Differences by educa-
tion were interesting. The percentages of college-educated and non-
college-educated respondents opposing the Bush privatization proposal
were about the same (roughly 38 percent). But many fewer of the college
educated were undecided (28 percent versus 46 percent). There were no
signiﬁcant differences on how best to reduce the looming Social Security
deﬁcit—no group wanted to see beneﬁts cut. 
Political Involvement. Ideology was pretty much a no-brainer on this
issue: conservatives were vastly more likely to favor partial privatization
356 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
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nonpoliticals (8 percent). Those who claimed to have voted in the 2000
election were much more likely to favor privatization (25 percent versus
10 percent of nonvoters) and much less likely to be undecided (35 percent
versus 54 percent). These differences are highly signiﬁcant (p = 0.000).
But, again, the subgroups did not differ signiﬁcantly in how they want to
reduce the Social Security deﬁcit. Those who were aware of the presi-
dent’s proposal were more inclined to support it (by 31 percent versus
7 percent). 
medicare and health insurance. We asked people whether Medi-
care currently included an outpatient drug beneﬁt. (It did not at the time of
the survey.) We followed that query by asking those who answered cor-
rectly or who said there was presently only partial coverage (74 percent of
all respondents),
“Would you favor or oppose adding a prescription drug beneﬁt to Medicare for
people who are not in the hospital, bearing in mind that it would have to be paid
for somehow?”
Despite the last clause, which we deemed important, the general view
was overwhelmingly supportive, with 80 percent in favor and only
12 percent opposed.38 And opinions on this issue did not differ signifi-
cantly by age (which we found surprising), sex, race, employment status,
income, or self-reported voting behavior. College-educated people were
a bit less likely to favor a Medicare drug benefit (by 82 percent versus
89 percent of the non-college-educated), but the difference was barely
significant (p = 0.033). The only highly significant difference was by
political ideology, but the ordering here was somewhat counterintuitive:
The proportion favoring a Medicare drug benefit was 95 percent among
liberals, 89 percent among nonpoliticals, 85 percent among conserva-
tives, and 79 percent among moderates.
The other health policy question was
“Do you favor or oppose what is called universal health insurance coverage,
meaning that the government would make sure that every American is covered
by a health insurance policy?”
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38. The rest did not know or gave no opinion. Of course, as was pointed out at the
Brookings Panel meeting, we did not specify a particular way of paying for the drug
benefit.
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gross overestimate of the extent of the problem. Such a misconception
might be expected to reduce support for universal coverage, if respon-
dents were thinking more about the high cost of reaching universal cover-
age, or increase support, if they were thinking more about the severity of
the problem. In any case over 75 percent of our respondents favored uni-
versal coverage.39 On this policy issue, differences of opinion across sub-
groups were the rule rather than the exception.
Demographics. Women were substantially more likely than men to
favor universal health insurance (80 percent versus 71 percent, p = 0.003),
and nonwhites were much more likely to favor it than whites (87 percent
versus 72 percent, p = 0.001). But there were no significant differences
by age.
Economic Status. Lower-income people were much more supportive
of universal coverage than were higher-income people (who were pro-
bably covered in any case), by a margin of 85 percent to 70 percent
(p = 0.000). And people without a college degree were significantly more
likely than college graduates to favor universal coverage (78 percent ver-
sus 68 percent, p = 0.001). But, surprisingly, employment status did not
matter.
Political Involvement. Politically disengaged nonvoters were much
more likely to favor universal health insurance than were self-reported
voters, by a margin of 85 percent to 71 percent (p = 0.000). Ideology mat-
tered, too. Liberals strongly favored universal coverage (90 percent did
so), whereas conservatives barely favored it (just 52 percent). Moderates
(79 percent) and nonpoliticals (87 percent) fell in between, but much
closer to the liberals (p = 0.000).
Econometric Models of Knowledge and Public Opinion
We return now to the ﬁve-equation model outlined earlier. Our primary
interest is in equations like equation 1, which explain people’s opinions
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39. However, the ordering of the questions mattered signiﬁcantly in this case. When
the policy question was asked before the inquiry about the number of uninsured, our
respondents favored universal health insurance by a margin of 74 percent to 22 percent.
When the ordering of the questions was reversed, the margin fell to 67 percent to 25 per-
cent. Getting people to think about the magnitude of the problem did suppress support a bit.
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(K), education (ED), and other demographic controls (X). Recall that we
identify the models by assuming a recursive structure. Readers unwilling
to accept this assumption may be skeptical of our interpretation of the
regression results (which is why we have reported only descriptive cross-
tabulations up to now).
Does Information Breed Knowledge?
We begin with estimates of equation 2, which explains our admittedly
imperfect measure of knowledge by information sources (the quantity and
nature of sources used by respondents), the desire to be informed, educa-
tion, and other demographic variables. We tried measuring respondents’
sources of information in three different ways: by QH and QL, the two
intensity-of-use variables deﬁned earlier; by the respondent’s primary
source of information; and by a set of twenty-two dummy variables indi-
cating, for each of the eleven sources, whether the respondent reported
using that source at least occasionally. We found that, once demographics
were controlled for, the twenty-two source dummies were jointly insignif-
icant (at the 10 percent level). Therefore we eliminated the third option
and concentrated on the other two.
Table 11 begins with the results of a linear regression with K on the
left-hand side and only QH, QL, and the demographic variables on the
right-hand side (column 11-1). The ﬁt is mediocre (adjusted R2 = 0.17),
and QH and QL are jointly insigniﬁcant—a result anticipated by table 9.
More-educated people, higher-income people, and married people are sig-
niﬁcantly more knowledgeable. 
Column 11-2 adds a set of three dummies indicating (in descending
order) the respondent’s expressed desire to be informed. All three are sig-
niﬁcant at the 5 percent level, and the pattern of the coefﬁcients means
that people with more desire to be informed do obtain higher knowledge
scores. But the adjusted R2 barely increases. 
In column 11-3 we add a set of variables identifying political ideology
and engagement variables. Liberals, conservatives, and moderates (the
control group) are no different in terms of knowledge. But people who
have not thought about their ideology score signiﬁcantly lower (although
this ﬁnding is signiﬁcant only at the 10 percent level). People who report
having voted in 2000 score signiﬁcantly higher.
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Table 11. Regressions Explaining Respondents’ Knowledge Scoresa
Independent variable 11-1 11-2 11-3
Intensity of use
Ratio of number of sources used “regularly 4.85 4.41 2.94
or often” to total sources used (QH) (3.80) (3.84) (3.87)
Ratio of number of sources used “rarely or  –2.11 –1.20 –0.13
never” to total sources used (QL) (3.21) (3.21) (3.24)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables 0.13 0.28 0.67
Desire to be informedb
Extremely important ... 10.05*** 7.91**
(3.60) (3.69)
Very important ... 8.44** 6.83*
(3.50) (3.58)
Somewhat important ... 8.04** 6.39*
(3.55) (3.64)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... 0.04 0.19
Ideology and voting behaviorc
Liberal ... ... –1.00
(1.78)
Conservative ... ... –1.27
(1.55)
Has not thought much about ideology ... ... –3.06*
(1.61)
Other ideology ... ... 2.33
(2.81)
Voted in 2000 ... ... 2.65**
(1.31)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... ... 0.05
Demographics
Log of income 1.96** 2.07** 2.01**
(0.82) (0.82) (0.82)
(continued)
Finally, in a fourth regression not reported here, we added ten dummies
representing sources of information, with the dummy equaling 1 when the
respondent identiﬁed that source as the most important. Three of the ten
coefﬁcients (for newspapers, magazines, and economists) were signiﬁcant
at the 10 percent level, and each indicated higher scores than the base
group (those who named television as their most important source). The
F-test for the ten dummies as a group also indicated statistical signiﬁcance
(F = 1.88, p = 0.045). The other results hardly changed.
Thus our overall conclusion is that both education and the desire to be
informed affect an individual’s knowledge positively, although the mag-
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primary source of information does affect his or her K score, but the gen-
eral intensity of information use does not. Educators will find these
results somewhat disheartening, although we acknowledge that the brief
test embedded in our survey assesses only a limited range of factual
knowledge—and that, even as such, the test is highly imperfect.
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40. Four more years of education raises the test score by 4 or 5 points, or about one-
quarter of a standard deviation.
Table 11. Regressions Explaining Respondents’ Knowledge Scoresa (continued)
Independent variable 11-1 11-2 11-3
Age 0.00 0.00 –0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Years of education 1.25*** 1.25*** 1.01***
(0.24) (0.24) (0.26)
Female –1.75 –1.86* –1.24
(1.09) (1.09) (1.10)
Blackd –2.33 –2.60 –2.87
(1.70) (1.70) (1.74)
Other race –6.40*** –6.32*** –5.86***
(2.01) (2.01) (2.03)
Hispanic 0.38 0.30 0.40
(2.05) (2.05) (2.06)
Unemployede 4.14* 3.87 3.88
(2.39) (2.38) (2.40)
Retired –1.12 –1.06 –1.22
(1.93) (1.93) (1.95)
Homemaker –1.50 –1.43 –1.10
(2.47) (2.47) (2.47)
Student or other nonemployed –0.38 –0.18 0.06
(1.65) (1.65) (1.68)
Marriedf 4.70*** 4.15*** 3.64**
(1.53) (1.54) (1.55)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. of observations  881 879 867
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.18 0.19
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from the survey described in the text.
a. The dependent variable is the respondent’s knowledge score (see text for deﬁnition). Standard errors are in parentheses.
***denotes signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
b. The omitted category is those who answered “Not important” or “Not very important.”
c. The omitted category is “Moderate.”
d. The omitted category is “White.”
e. The omitted category is “Employed.”
f. The model also included demographic controls for three other categories of marital status, not shown here.
2259-04-Blinder.qxd    8/6/04    11:20    Page  361Who Believes What? And Why?
For each of the ﬁve policy areas mentioned above, we now seek to esti-
mate the relative roles of self-interest, ideology, and knowledge in form-
ing public opinion—equation 1 in the model. In some sense this is the
natural culmination of our inquiry, since information use and knowledge
are, in this context, just way stations on the road to public opinion.
the bush tax cuts. Because 31 percent of respondents offered inter-
mediate responses (either a mixed opinion or no opinion) about the 2003
tax cut proposals, we estimated ordered probit models for opinion on the
proposals with three choices: oppose, mixed response, or favor—in
ascending order. Thus positive coefﬁcients in table 12 indicate more
favorable attitudes toward the Bush tax cuts. The magnitudes of the esti-
mated coefﬁcients in an ordered probit model are not easy to interpret, but
the relative magnitudes are. For example, column 12-1 reports that the
coefﬁcient on the dummy variable for being black is almost ten times as
large as the coefﬁcient for years of education. That means that being black
has roughly the same effect on the underlying probabilities as ten more
years of education.
The estimates reported in table 12 are interesting and, for the most part,
indicative of what we report later about opinions on other policy issues.
Column 12-1 begins by trying to explain attitudes toward the tax cut by
purely demographic variables, plus the logarithm of income. Since the
2003 tax cut proposal, unlike the 2001 tax cut, offered virtually no bene-
ﬁts to low- and moderate-income taxpayers, household income should be
an excellent measure of self-interest here. The model does not explain
much: the pseudo-R2 measure of goodness-of-ﬁt is below 0.02. Further-
more, virtually none of the demographic variables in column 12-1 matter.
More-educated people and blacks are more opposed to the tax cuts, but
little more than that can be said.41 (Remember, when we looked at simple
correlations, several demographic variables were signiﬁcant.) Although
household income has the correct sign in all three models in table 12—
that is, richer people do favor the tax cuts more—the coefﬁcient is never
signiﬁcant. Where have you gone, homo economicus?42
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41. Among our four controls for marital status (not shown in the table), one is signiﬁ-
cant (p = 0.01): divorced and separated people are more likely to favor the Bush tax cuts.
42. Both Bartels (2003) and Slemrod (2003) emphasize the role of popular miscon-
ceptions in generating public opinion on tax policy in general and on the Bush tax cuts in 
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of them are signiﬁcant, and the pseudo-R2 jumps dramatically to 0.12.43
The table also reports χ2 tests (whose p-values are reported below each set
of regressors), which clearly show that both ideology and knowledge are
strongly associated with opinions on the tax cuts.
Ideology is measured both by political ideology, as discussed above,
and by opinions on whether the tax burden is too high or too low and
whether taxes should be progressive.44 Column 12-2 shows that ideology
matters quite a lot. Conservatives are much more favorably disposed
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particular. Slemrod ﬁnds that more-educated people suffer somewhat less from these
misconceptions.
43. This is not an entirely clean comparison, since the sample size drops from 874 to
722 observations because of missing data.
44. The precise question is, “Do you agree or disagree with the statement that higher-
income households should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than lower-income
households?”
Table 12. Ordered Probit Model for Favoring Bush Tax Cuta
Regression
Independent variable 12-1 12-2 12-3
Self-interest
Log of income 0.09 0.10 0.11
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variable 0.13 0.160 0.147
Ideology and political behavior
Liberal ... –0.41*** –0.43***
(0.15) (0.15)
Conservative ... 0.70*** 0.60***
(0.13) (0.14)
Has not thought much about ideology ... 0.03 –0.02
(0.13) (0.14)
Other ideology ... –0.27 –0.45*
(0.23) (0.24)
Voted in 2000 ... –0.11 –0.06
(0.11) (0.12)
Believes taxes too high ... 0.57*** 0.63***
(0.10) (0.10)
Believes taxes too lowb ... –0.70** –0.78**
(0.30) (0.31)
Likes progressivity ... –0.16* –0.08
(0.09) (0.10)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... 0.000 0.000
(continued)
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Table 12. Ordered Probit Model for Favoring Bush Tax Cuta (continued)
Regression
Independent variable 12-1 12-2 12-3
Knowledge
Knowledge score ... –0.012*** –0.011***
(0.003) (0.003)
Answer on typical family’s tax share ... –0.09 0.09
(0.30) (0.31)
Believes income tax larger for most ... –0.12 –0.13
(0.09) (0.10)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... 0.005 0.006
Opinion on federal deﬁcitc
Deﬁcit a serious problem ... ... –0.70***
(0.24)
Deﬁcit a minor problem ... ... –0.24
(0.24)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... ... 0.000
Demographics
Years of education –0.037** 0.017 0.020
(0.018) (0.022) (0.023)
Age –0.001 0.0007 0.0031
(0.004) (0.0043) (0.0045)
Female 0.017 –0.05 0.004
(0.082) (0.09) (0.098)
Black –0.35*** –0.26* –0.22
(0.12) (0.15) (0.16)
Other race 0.004 –0.11 –0.07
(0.156) (0.18) (0.18)
Hispanic 0.20 0.38** 0.41**
(0.16) (0.18) (0.18)
Unemployed –0.15 –0.002 0.09
(0.17) (0.21) (0.21)
Retired –0.004 0.01 –0.04
(0.146) (0.17) (0.18)
Homemaker 0.13 0.27 0.23
(0.19) (0.22) (0.23)
Student or other nonemployed –0.17 –0.13 –0.05
(0.12) (0.14) (0.15)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables 0.004 0.162 0.239
No. of observations  874 722 697
Log-likelihood  –921 –680 –645
Pseudo-R2 0.018 0.12 0.14
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from the survey described in the text.
a. The dependent variable is the respondent’s opinion on the federal tax cut proposed in 2003, where “favored” = 3, a mixed
response = 2, and “did not favor” = 1. See table 11, notes c–f, for more detail about the speciﬁcation. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. ***denotes signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
b. The omitted category is “Believes taxes about right.” 
c. The omitted category is “Deﬁcit not a problem.”
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base group, which was moderates). Similarly, those who think taxes are
too high are vastly more likely to favor the Bush tax proposal than are
those who think taxes are too low.45 (In this case, the omitted group is
those who answered that taxes are “about right.”) Finally, those who
believe taxes should be progressive are less likely to favor the Bush pro-
posal, although this coefﬁcient becomes insigniﬁcant in the model in
column 12-3.
We measure knowledge in two ways: general knowledge and knowl-
edge speciﬁc to tax policy. Our constructed K score measures general
knowledge. Speciﬁc knowledge about taxes is measured by the estimated
tax share and by whether the respondent knew that most people pay more
in payroll taxes than in income taxes. (Recall that these two indicators of
speciﬁc knowledge are also part of the general knowledge score.)
Although general knowledge matters in the estimated model, speciﬁc
knowledge about taxes does not—and most of the coefﬁcients appear to
be incorrectly signed. (The ﬁnding about general knowledge is the one
result in table 12 that is not typical of what is to come.) The a priori “cor-
rect” sign on the coefﬁcient of K is unclear, since the composite score
measures knowledge of facts, not of economic theory, labor supply elas-
ticities, or anything like that. But people with more factual knowledge
about the economy apparently are less supportive of the Bush tax cut pro-
posal, ceteris paribus.
In column 12-3 we add a pair of dummy variables for whether the
respondent believes the budget deﬁcit is a major problem or a minor prob-
lem (the omitted category is “no problem at all”). It seems obvious that
views on this question should inﬂuence support for the Bush tax cuts—
and they do. However, the standard identiﬁcation assumption may be dif-
ﬁcult to sustain in this case. It seems quite possible that some unmeasured
inﬂuence (call it “liking George W. Bush”) that makes a respondent favor
the Bush tax cut also makes him or her downplay the importance of bud-
get deﬁcits. Hence some readers may prefer to ignore column 12-3. Fortu-
nately, including or excluding these two variables does not change the
other coefﬁcients much.
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45. Readers can decide for themselves whether they want to think of this as an “ideol-
ogy” variable but should recall that the regression already controls for the estimated tax
share.
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the deﬁcit part of the questionnaire by asking all respondents how much
of a problem they think the federal budget deﬁcit poses.46 We ordered the
three possible responses in ascending order of concern about the deﬁcit:
no problem at all, a minor problem, or a serious problem. Positive coefﬁ-
cients in the ordered probit estimates of table 13 thus indicate greater
concern.
As the reader may recall, about half the respondents were asked how
large they think the deﬁcit is, but fewer than half answered the question.
So, although it seems sensible to use the estimated deﬁcit as a regressor,
doing so would shrink the sample by more than three-quarters. For this
reason table 13 presents only regressions that exclude the estimated deﬁcit
variable. Sufﬁce it to say that equations that included the estimated deﬁcit
showed that people who think the deﬁcit is larger are more worried about
it, and that including the estimated deﬁcit did not change the signs of the
other coefﬁcients.
As before, we start with an initial model that includes only demo-
graphic variables plus the only self-interest variable we could think of for
the deﬁcit issue, namely, income, which becomes insigniﬁcant once we
control for ideology (see column 13-2). The ﬁt is poor, although better
than in table 12. Women, blacks, older people, and more-educated people
are more concerned about the deﬁcit (the last group barely so).
The ideology variables, which are added in column 13-2, are more
interesting, and adding them more than doubles the pseudo-R2. Conserva-
tives are less concerned about the deﬁcit than are liberals and moderates,
and those with “other” ideologies look a lot like conservatives in this
respect. Similarly, people who favor progressive taxation—another way
to identify liberals?—are signiﬁcantly more concerned. People who think
taxes are too high are more  worried about the deﬁcit (column 13-3),
whereas people who think taxes are too low are less worried. (The ﬁrst of
these coefﬁcients is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, but the second is
not.) This ﬁnding may indicate that many respondents expect the eventual
cure for the deﬁcit problem to be higher taxes. When it comes to knowl-
edge, neither our composite score nor speciﬁc knowledge about taxes
affects opinion on the deﬁcit signiﬁcantly. 
366 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
46. A more direct policy question was also asked—whether the respondent thought the
deﬁcit should be reduced—but the vast majority of respondents answered yes, making the
answers rather uninteresting to analyze.
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Table 13. Ordered Probit Model for Opinion on the Federal Deﬁcita
Regression
Independent variable 13-1 13-2 13-3
Self-interest
Log of income –0.17** –0.11 –0.08
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables 0.01 0.16 0.30
Ideology and political behavior
Liberal ... 0.01 –0.01
(0.16) (0.16)
Conservative ... –0.53*** –0.62***
(0.13) (0.14)
Has not thought much about ideology ... –0.19 –0.24
(0.15) (0.15)
Other ideology ... –0.46* –0.51**
(0.24) (0.25)
Voted in 2000 ... 0.07 0.10
(0.12) (0.13)
Believes taxes too high ... ... 0.20**
(0.10)
Believes taxes too lowb ... ... –0.31
(0.26)
Likes progressivity ... 0.30*** 0.34***
(0.10) (0.10)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... 0.00 0.00
Knowledge
Knowledge score ... 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Answer on typical family’s tax share ... 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Believes income tax larger for most ... –0.02 –0.00
(0.10) (0.10)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... 0.81 0.84
Survey design
Respondent not told deﬁcit sizec 0.20** 0.18* 0.17*
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables 0.02 0.07 0.08
Demographics
Years of education 0.03* 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age 0.009** 0.010** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Female 0.24*** 0.37*** 0.34***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Black 0.35** 0.43** 0.40**
(0.15) (0.18) (0.18)
(continued)
2259-04-Blinder.qxd    8/6/04    11:20    Page  367Opinions vary greatly on the methods that should be used to reduce the
deﬁcit. Here we estimated two probit models, both shown in table 14,
including only the subset of respondents who said the deﬁcit ought to be
reduced. Since the choices were “raising taxes,” “cutting spending,” or
“both,” we created two binary variables:
Taxes = 1 if the respondent chose raising taxes or both
= 0 otherwise,
and
Spending = 1 if the respondent chose cutting spending or both
= 0 otherwise,
and we estimated an ordinary probit model for each. The model for
“Spending” is less interesting, however, since almost everyone thinks
368 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
Table 13. Ordered Probit Model for Opinion on the Federal Deﬁcita (continued)
Regression
Independent variable 13-1 13-2 13-3
Other race 0.19 0.16 0.15
(0.17) (0.19) (0.19)
Hispanic 0.16 0.16 0.12
(0.17) (0.19) (0.19)
Unemployed 0.15 0.36 0.33
(0.20) (0.24) (0.24)
Retired –0.24 –0.21 –0.20
(0.16) (0.19) (0.19)
Homemaker –0.24 –0.40* –0.26
(0.20) (0.22) (0.23)
Student or other nonemployed .10 .25 .30*
(0.14) (0.16) (0.16)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. of observations 842 716 701
Log-likelihood –661 –535 –516
Pseudo-R2 0.04 0.09 0.10
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from the survey described in the text.
a. The dependent variable is the respondent’s opinion on the deﬁcit as a problem, where “serious problem” = 3, “minor prob-
lem” = 2, and “not a problem” = 1. See table 11, notes c–f, for more detail about the speciﬁcation. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. ***denotes signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
b. The omitted category is “Believes taxes about right.” 
c. The variable equals 1 if the respondent was not told the size of the deﬁcit before being asked whether the deﬁcit was a
problem.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2259-04-Blinder.qxd    8/6/04    11:20    Page  371spending cuts should be part of the solution, whereas our respondents
split almost 50-50 on whether higher taxes should be part of the solution.
What do we ﬁnd? Beginning with self-interest, higher-income people
are slightly less likely to favor raising taxes and slightly more likely to
favor cutting spending. But neither coefﬁcient is generally signiﬁcant.
Thus, once again, self-interest seems to matter little. In this case ideology
also matters rather less than might be expected: liberals and people of
“other” ideologies are far less likely to favor cuts in spending. Naturally,
people who believe that taxes are already too high are far less likely to
favor the tax-hike alternative and far more likely to favor spending cuts,
and those who think taxes are too low tend to hold the opposite views.
Self-professed voters are less enthusiastic about cutting spending and a bit
more enthusiastic about raising taxes than are nonvoters, but the coefﬁ-
cients are not always signiﬁcant. Respondents with higher levels of gen-
eral economic knowledge are marginally less likely to favor tax hikes.
And those who (wrongly) believe that income taxes are typically larger
than payroll taxes are much less enamored of tax hikes. Among the demo-
graphic variables, the only consistently signiﬁcant effect is that older peo-
ple are less likely to favor raising taxes.
raising the minimum wage. Table 15 displays results from a series
of ordinary (binary) probit models to explain support for raising the mini-
mum wage. Separating self-interest from some of the demographic deter-
minants of opinion is tricky in this case because our survey offers no
direct information on respondents’ wage rates. We do, however, have
data on several obvious correlates of wages, such as income, race, sex,
and education—all of which show up as signiﬁcant determinants of opin-
ion in column 15-1. In each case the sign of the coefﬁcient is consistent
with the simple hypothesis that lower-wage people are more likely to
favor raising the minimum wage than higher-wage people. Apart from
these potential wage proxies, the demographic variables are insigniﬁcant.
Following the pattern of previous tables, columns 15-2 and 15-3 add
ideology and knowledge variables to the model. Although ideology once
again contributes notably to explaining opinion, only conservatives stand
out from the pack in being less favorably disposed toward raising the min-
imum wage.
The knowledge variables are more interesting. General knowledge is
irrelevant, but people who guessed high on the question about the existing
minimum wage are decidedly less likely to support raising it. Similarly,
372 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
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Table 15. Binary Probit Model for Supporting Minimum Wage Increasea
Regression
Independent variable 15-1 15-2 15-3
Self-interest
Log of income –0.22*** –0.19** –0.28***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables 0.03 0.08 0.011
Ideology and political behavior
Liberal ... 0.12 0.19
(0.19) (0.22)
Conservative ... –0.48*** –0.39**
(0.15) (0.17)
Has not thought much about ideology ... 0.10 0.10
(0.17) (0.20)
Other ideology ... –0.09  –0.06
(0.29) (0.32)
Voted in 2000 ... –0.03 –0.24
(0.14) (0.17)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... 0.000 0.002
Knowledge
Knowledge score ... 0.004 –0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
Answer on current value of minimum wage ... ... –0.18***
(0.06)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... 0.34 0.006
Opinion on effect of rise in minimum wage
A lot will lose jobs ... ... –1.73***
(0.25)
Some will lose jobs ... ... –0.95***
(0.13)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... ... 0.002
Demographics
Years of education –0.08*** –0.09*** –0.07**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Age –0.002 0.001 –0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Female 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.47***
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13)
Black 1.18*** 1.05*** 1.13**
(0.29) (0.30) (0.46)
Other race 0.40* 0.38 0.34
(0.22) (0.23) (0.26)
Hispanic 0.23 0.17 0.34
(0.23) (0.24) (0.27)
Unemployed –0.04 –0.14 0.41
(0.26) (0.26) (0.31)
(continued)
2259-04-Blinder.qxd    8/6/04    11:20    Page  373those who believe that a higher minimum wage would cause the loss of
either “a lot of” jobs (6 percent of the sample) or “some” jobs (36 percent)
are much less likely to favor raising it than are those who believe that
“hardly anyone” would lose their job (57 percent of the sample). Compar-
ing columns 15-2 and 15-3 shows that these three variables measuring
speciﬁc knowledge contribute enormously to the goodness of ﬁt.
The minimum wage is arguably the one policy that we have examined
where a good case can be made that self-interest—or at least group inter-
est—and economic beliefs and knowledge are as strong an influence on
public opinion as ideology. For example, when the estimated coefficients
shown in column 15-3 are translated into marginal effects on proba-
bilities, we find that self-identified conservatives are 13 percentage
points less likely than liberals to support a minimum wage increase. Sim-
ilarly, support for an increase is 14 points higher among blacks than
among whites, 16 points higher among those in the poorest 15 percent of
households than among those in the richest 15 percent, 10 points higher
among women than among men, and an impressive 58 points lower
among those who believe that a lot of workers will lose their jobs from a
higher minimum wage than among those who believe very few will lose
their job. 
social security policy. We asked two questions about Social Secu-
rity policy: whether respondents supported President Bush’s plan for par-
374 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
Table 15. Binary Probit Model for Supporting Minimum Wage Increasea (continued)
Regression
Independent variable 15-1 15-2 15-3
Retired –0.17 –0.20 –0.02
(0.20) (0.20) (0.23)
Homemaker 0.09 0.10 0.16
(0.26) (0.26) (0.30)
Student or other nonemployed –0.14 –0.14 –0.37*
(0.18) (0.18) (0.21)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of observations  838 823 761
Log-likelihood  –380 –364 –284
Pseudo-R2 0.13 0.16 0.29
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from the survey described in the text.
a. The dependent variable is whether the respondent favors increasing the minimum wage, where “yes” = 1 and “no” = 0. See
table 11, notes c–f, for more detail about the speciﬁcation. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes signiﬁcantly different
from zero at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
2259-04-Blinder.qxd    8/6/04    11:20    Page  374tial privatization, and how (if at all) the looming Social Security deﬁcit
should be reduced.
Where Social Security was concerned, we included several novel self-
interest variables, in addition to income, in the survey (top panel of
table 16). Broadening the concept of self-interest just a bit, we asked
whether the respondent’s mother, father, or both were still alive. We also
asked respondents whether they expected Social Security to be a “major
source” of their own retirement income, a “minor source,” or “not much
of a source at all.” Presumably, people in the ﬁrst category have a much
greater stake in the outcome of the Social Security debate. Older workers
should also have more of a stake in the current system. 
When it comes to attitudes toward personal accounts, the subjective
self-interest measure of anticipated Social Security income is signiﬁcant,
whereas the more objective ones—income, whether the parents are alive,
and age—have inconsistent and weak effects, although they are some-
times signiﬁcant in the expected direction. The χ2 tests for the entire
group of self-interest variables show statistical signiﬁcance beyond the
1 percent level in columns 16-2 and 16-3, and the importance of Social
Security beneﬁts in retirement income is signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. 
The knowledge variables—whether general or speciﬁc to Social Secu-
rity—make little contribution to explaining opinions on privatizing Social
Security. As noted earlier, respondents who were aware of President
Bush’s proposal are more likely to support it, but the difference is not sig-
niﬁcant (p = 0.19). More-educated people are slightly more likely to favor
partial privatization.
Political ideology matters much more than knowledge. Not surpris-
ingly, conservatives are much more likely to back privatization and liber-
als more likely to oppose it.
In the questions about how to reduce the actuarial deﬁcit, the choices
were “mainly by raising the payroll tax” (chosen by 30 percent of respon-
dents),  “mainly by reducing Social Security beneﬁts” (5 percent), or
“both” (34 percent).47 We created two dummy variables analogous to
those for deﬁcit reduction policy:
SS-Taxes = 1 if the respondent chose raising payroll taxes or both
= 0 otherwise,
Alan S. Blinder and Alan B. Krueger 375
47. We excluded those who did not answer (9 percent of the sample) and those who
said “neither” (22 percent).
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Table 16. Ordered Probit Model for Favoring Personal Investment Accounts within
Social Securitya
Regression
Independent variable 16-1 16-2 16-3
Self-interest
Log of income 0.15** 0.11 0.11
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Age 0.004 –0.008 –0.009*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Both parents alive 0.18 0.05 –0.04
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Only mother alive 0.06 0.03 0.05
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Only father aliveb 0.01 –0.15 –0.14
(0.20) (0.24) (0.24)
Expects Social Security to be major  –0.22* –0.40*** –0.36***
income source (0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
Expects Social Security to be minor  –0.17* –0.31*** –0.30**
income sourcec (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables 0.06 0.004 0.003
Ideology and political behavior
Liberal ... –0.38*** –0.40***
(0.15) (0.15)
Conservative ... 0.87*** 0.87***
(0.13) (0.13)
Has not thought much about ideology ... 0.31** 0.34**
(0.14) (0.14)
Other ideology ... –0.12 –0.18
(0.23) (0.24)
Voted in 2000 ... 0.04 0.02
(0.11) (0.11)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... 0.000 0.000
Knowledge
Knowledge score ... 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Answer on monthly Social Security beneﬁt ... 0.09 0.10
(0.09) (0.09)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... 0.35 0.41
Other knowledge
Aware of Bush personal accounts proposal ... ... 0.13
(0.10)
Aware of projected Social Security deﬁcit ... ... 0.05
(0.11)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... ... 0.36
(continued)
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SS-Spending = 1 if the respondent chose cutting beneﬁts or both
= 0 otherwise,
and we ran binary probit models for each. The results are displayed in
table 17.
Our ability to explain people’s opinions on this important public policy
issue is quite modest (pseudo-R2s are in the 0.06 to 0.07 range in both
cases). Surprisingly, and in contrast to the results in table 16, the six self-
interest variables are not signiﬁcant determinants of opinion, either indi-
vidually or as a group, once political ideology variables are included. Nor
Alan S. Blinder and Alan B. Krueger 377
Table 16. Ordered Probit Model for Favoring Personal Investment Accounts within
Social Securitya (continued)
Regression
Independent variable 16-1 16-2 16-3
Demographics
Years of education 0.03 0.05** 0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Female –0.26*** –0.15 –0.11
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Black –0.16 –0.07 –0.06
(0.13) (0.16) (0.16)
Other race –0.04 –0.24 –0.25
(0.15) (0.17) (0.17)
Hispanic 0.15 0.34** 0.34**
(0.15) (0.17) (0.17)
Unemployed –0.05 0.07 0.03
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19)
Retired –0.10 –0.03 –0.02
(0.15) (0.17) (0.17)
Homemaker 0.18 0.14 0.12
(0.18) (0.20) (0.20)
Student or other nonemployed –0.06 –0.04 –0.06
(0.13) (0.15) (0.15)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables 0.19 0.22 0.38
No. of observations  862 736 731
Log-likelihood  –883 –713 –706
Pseudo-R
2 0.03 0.10 0.10
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from the survey described in the text.
a. The dependent variable is the respondent’s opinion on the Bush administration proposal to replace part of Social Security
with private individual accounts, where “favors” = 3, “undecided” = 2, and “opposes” = 1. See table 11, notes c–f, for more detail
about the speciﬁcation. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1 percent level,
** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
b. The omitted category is “Neither parent alive.”
c. The omitted category is “Expects Social Security to be not much of a source [of retirement income] at all.”




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2259-04-Blinder.qxd    8/6/04    11:20    Page  380does ideology itself matter very much. (The χ2 statistics are insigniﬁcant
in all cases.)
Knowledge does matter, however. Respondents with higher general
knowledge scores are a bit less likely to favor raising the payroll tax, and
people with higher estimates of the average monthly Social Security ben-
eﬁt are, surprisingly, less likely to want to cut them. (But the coefﬁcient is
barely signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.) Interestingly, those who said
they were aware of President Bush’s privatization proposal are signiﬁ-
cantly (at the 5 percent level) less willing to cut Social Security beneﬁts.
On the demographics, women and students are signiﬁcantly less
inclined to cut beneﬁts, whereas Hispanics are more inclined (but the
coefﬁcient is barely signiﬁcant). Unemployed people are decidedly less
enthusiastic than others about raising payroll taxes.
health insurance policy. Our last two policy questions pertain to
health insurance. As discussed above, we asked respondents whether they
favored adding a prescription drug beneﬁt to Medicare and whether they
favored universal coverage.
In addition to age and income, the survey included what we believed
would be useful self-interest variables tailored to these questions. As
already noted, we asked whether the respondent’s parents were alive; we
also asked whether the respondent or anyone in his or her immediate
family was uninsured. We begin with table 18, which displays the results
for an ordinary probit model of opinion on universal health insurance
coverage.
Higher-income people are signiﬁcantly more opposed to universal cov-
erage (p = 0.000), and uninsured respondents are more likely to favor it
(p = 0.004 in column 18-1, but p = 0.108 in column 18-2).48 However, nei-
ther age nor having an uninsured family member affects one’s opinion.
The coefﬁcients on own insurance coverage imply that people who lack
health insurance are more likely to support universal coverage (by 12 per-
centage points in column 18-1 and 8 points in column 18-2). As usual,
measures of political ideology are successful as regressors. Liberals are
far more likely to favor universal coverage, and conservatives are much
more likely to oppose it. Interestingly, self-reported voters are less likely
Alan S. Blinder and Alan B. Krueger 381
48. Our results indicate more of an impact of self-interest on support for universal
health insurance than has been found in previous research. For example, Sears and others
(1980) ﬁnd that a respondent’s support for government-funded national health insurance is
unrelated to his or her own health insurance coverage.
2259-04-Blinder.qxd    8/6/04    11:20    Page  381to favor universal coverage. Knowledge appears to have a modest effect
on opinions on universal coverage. The general knowledge score is irrele-
vant, as usual. But people with higher estimates of the uncovered popu-
lation are a bit more likely to favor universal coverage.49 Finally,
demographic variables do not seem to matter—not even age. Column
18-1 indicates that blacks are more likely than whites to favor universal
coverage, but the coefﬁcient becomes insigniﬁcant once ideology and
knowledge are added to the equation (column 18-2).
382 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
49. The coefﬁcient implies that a 10-percentage-point increase in the presumed uncov-
ered population is associated with a 3-percentage-point increase in support for universal
health insurance.
Table 18. Binary Probit Model for Favoring Universal Health Insurancea
Regression
Independent variable 18-1 18-2
Self-interest




Family member uninsured –0.11 –0.15
(0.18) (0.20)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables 0.000 0.005





Has not thought much about ideology ... 0.15
(0.20)
Other ideology ... –0.48
(0.30)
Voted in 2000 ... –0.40** 
(0.17)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... 0.000
Knowledge
Knowledge score ... 0.002
(0.005)
Answer on percent of Americans uninsured ... 0.009**
(0.005)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... 0.12
(continued)
2259-04-Blinder.qxd    8/6/04    11:20    Page  382Table 19 explores the determinants of public opinion about adding a
prescription drug beneﬁt to Medicare; we limit the sample to respondents
who, at the time of the survey, knew that Medicare did not cover prescrip-
tion drugs. Here demographics matter more than it does on most other
policy issues. Blacks and more-educated people are far less likely to sup-
port such a beneﬁt, whereas students are much more likely to support it.
The results on self-interest, ideology, and knowledge are by now familiar:
self-interest and knowledge are not signiﬁcant determinants of opinion,
but political ideology is. In particular, liberals and respondents with
“other” (than liberal, conservative, or moderate) ideology are substan-
tially more likely to support a prescription drug beneﬁt. So are self-
professed voters, at least in two of the three speciﬁcations.
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Table 18. Binary Probit Model for Favoring Universal Health Insurance (continued)
Regression
Independent variable 18-1 18-2
Demographics


















Student or other nonemployed 0.24 0.18
(0.19) (0.22)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables 0.03 0.17
No. of observations  761 674
Log-likelihood  –356 –287
Pseudo-R2 0.12 0.21
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from the survey described in the text.
a. The dependent variable is whether the respondent favors universal health insurance, where 1 = “yes” and 0 = “no.” See table
11, notes c–f, for more details of the speciﬁcation. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes signiﬁcantly different from zero
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
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Taken as a whole, our survey results hold little good news for those of
us engaged in economic education or economic policy—or for economic
theorists who use homo economicus as the backbone of their models of
political economy. 
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Table 19. Ordered Probit Model for Favoring Prescription Drug 
Insurance in Medicarea
Regression
Independent variable 19-1 19-2 19-3
Self-interest
Log of income 0.100  0.100  0.107 
(0.119) (0.119) (0.128)
Age –0.008 –0.007 –0.016*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Both parents alive –0.010 0.022 –0.111
(0.220) (0.221) (0.231)
Only father alive 0.297  0.306  0.083 
(0.470) (0.465) (0.480)
Only mother aliveb –0.250 –0.284 –0.350
(0.236) (0.237) (0.245)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables 0.524 0.453 0.240
Ideology and political behavior
Liberal 1.064*** 1.069*** 0.766**
(0.295) (0.294) (0.313)
Conservative 0.143 0.152 –0.127
(0.187) (0.186) (0.209)
Has not thought much about ideology 0.312 0.360* –0.182
(0.204) (0.206) (0.239)
Other ideology 1.068** 1.069** 0.640 
(0.544) (0.542) (0.564)
Voted in 2000 0.374** 0.432** 0.192 
(0.185) (0.187) (0.210)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables 0.002 0.001 0.023
Knowledge
Knowledge score ... 0.003  0.005 
(0.005) (0.005)
Believes Medicare already partly covers drugsc ... ... 0.079 
... ... (0.199)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables ... 0.559 0.587
(continued)
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ple of Americans does express a strong desire to be well informed about
major economic policy issues. And their factual knowledge is, on aver-
age, reasonably good. From where does their information come? The
short answer is television, followed at a (long) distance by local (rather
than national) newspapers. Unfortunately, as a source of information,
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Table 19. Ordered Probit Model for Favoring Prescription Drug 
Insurance in Medicarea (continued)
Regression
Independent variable 19-1 19-2 19-3
Demographics
Years of education –0.095*** –0.099*** –0.140***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.038)
Female 0.197 0.236 0.086 
(0.153) (0.155) (0.170)
Black –0.589** –0.594** –0.506
(0.231) (0.232) (0.261)
Other race –0.012 –0.138 –0.260
(0.295) (0.304) (0.326)
Hispanic –0.100 –0.027 –0.209
(0.293) (0.301) (0.322)
Student or other nonemployed 1.056*** 1.040*** 1.131**
(0.386) (0.383) (0.517)
Unemployed –0.130 –0.156 –0.326
(0.317) (0.317) (0.336)
Retired 0.009 0.050 0.434 
(0.257) (0.260) (0.286)
Homemaker –0.015 –0.028 0.270
(0.342) (0.340) (0.377)
Married 0.440** 0.398* 0.213 
(0.221) (0.220) (0.243)
p-value of joint signiﬁcance of variables 0.002 0.001 0.001
No. of observations 629 626 567
Log-likelihood –206 –202 –176
Pseudo-R2 0.128 0.133 0.139 
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from the survey described in the text.
a. The dependent variable is the respondent’s opinion on enactment of a prescription drug beneﬁt within Medicare, where
“favors” = 3, “no answer” = 2, and “opposes” = 1. The sample includes only those who answered (correctly) that Medicare did
not cover prescription drugs outside of the hospital for Medicare patients at the time of the survey, or who said coverage was only
partial. See table 11, notes c–f, for more detail about the speciﬁcation. Equations also control for order of questions. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ***denotes signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the
10 percent level.
b. The omitted category is “Neither parent alive.”
c. The sample excludes those who said they believed that Medicare already provided full prescription drug coverage.
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ranks eighth among the eleven possible sources of information in its con-
tribution to our constructed measure of economic knowledge, although
we recognize that one can question the direction of causality here.
Perhaps more disconcerting, economic knowledge is barely higher among
those people who use more sources of information, use information more
intensively, or express a stronger desire to be informed than do others. On
the other hand, people with more education and more income are more
knowledgeable.
As a broad generalization—some exceptions to which we have
noted—ideology seems to play a stronger role in shaping opinion on eco-
nomic policy issues than either self-interest or knowledge, although spe-
ciﬁc (as opposed to general) knowledge does inﬂuence opinion on a
number of matters.50 This ﬁnding is not terribly different from the conclu-
sion reached by Victor Fuchs, Krueger, and James Poterba in their survey
of professional economists:51 left-right ideology seemed to shape opinion
more than parameter estimates did. The contrast with homo economicus—
who is well informed, nonideological, and extremely self-interested—
could hardly be more stark. Instead, our ﬁndings seem more consistent
with an idea expressed in the political science literature, namely, that peo-
ple often use ideology as a short-cut heuristic for deciding what position
to take, when properly informing oneself is difﬁcult.52
In closing, we offer two speculative explanations for this basic ﬁnding:
confusion and generosity of spirit. Both explanations start from the
premise that people typically develop conventional (“ideological”) beliefs
about how the world works and about what is good for them and for the
commonweal. Thereafter the two explanations diverge. The confusion
explanation emphasizes how misperceptions of their own self-interest can
lead people to act (or, in the case of our respondents, to speak) against
their best interests.53 The generosity explanation emphasizes that, at least
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50. Of course, our K variable measures knowledge with considerable error, which
probably biases its coefﬁcient downward.
51. Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba (1998).
52. See, for example, Lupia (1994).
53. Bartels (2003) and Slemrod (2003) fall squarely within this camp. Romer (2003)
provides a start at modeling political outcomes under the assumption that voters have sys-
tematic misperceptions.
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ested in what they perceive to be the common good than they are in their
own narrow self-interest.54 In both cases there is at least room for hope
that greater knowledge will improve decisionmaking, even though it
appears from our survey that efforts in this dimension have shown less
than impressive results to date. 
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Discussion
William D. Nordhaus: In a democracy, one might suppose, the decisions
of elected politicians are to some extent inﬂuenced by public opinion.
This is the motivation for the question, which Alan Blinder and Alan
Krueger address in this paper, of how public opinion and, speciﬁcally,
public opinion about economic affairs is determined. 
Blinder and Krueger investigate the state of economic knowledge and
preferences among the general public by tracking down a random sample
and asking them a battery of fact questions (to determine their knowl-
edge), personal questions (to determine their self-interest), and economic
policy questions (to see where they stand on the issues of the day). No one
should be surprised to learn that the authors have gone about this task in a
thoughtful manner and have produced many interesting ﬁndings. The sur-
vey has been carefully administered, and the response rate is high. My
comments will raise a number of questions about their questions, which
leave me thinking that survey research is even harder than I originally
imagined.
To begin with, one might ask whether the respondents behave like the
textbook  homo economicus classicus. Somewhere, someone probably
believes that economic policy opinions are formed by continuous-time
maximization of a consistent preference function maximizing the present
value of the utility of consumption using Bayesian updating in light of the
constant inﬂow of data from the Internet, several televisions tuned to the
ﬁnancial channels, and a live feed from the Brookings Panel. But anyone
who still entertains that notion will quickly discard it after reading this
paper.
388
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public opinions about the economy in a democracy are the outcome of a
very complex process in which people try to sort through conﬂicting
accounts and theories, often provided by unreliable narrators. The news
contains much factual reporting (including the Dow Jones average to
seven signiﬁcant digits), but very little analytical reporting. Analyses are
often shaded by political motives (if by public ﬁgures), by proﬁt motives
(if by companies), or by desire for publicity (if by private individuals).
Even a good news source such as PBS’s Jim Lehrer NewsHour feels it has
to present a balanced point of view, where “balanced” means someone is
there to defend supply-side economics.
Americans report that, of all professions, they trust nurses most and car
salesmen and HMO managers least.1 Canadians report that they trust
pharmacists most and national politicians least (only 9 percent of Canadi-
ans trust the latter).2 Yet people get much of their economic knowledge
from national politicians and little from nurses and pharmacists. I suspect
that most people view getting economic information somewhat akin to
extracting a referral from their HMO. Given the difﬁculties of knowing
whom to trust and the contentiousness of most policy discussions, it
would not be surprising if the public is confused at best and ill informed at
worst.
How do Blinder and Krueger attack this issue? They administer a bat-
tery of nine fact questions to see how their respondents have sorted
through the varieties of conﬂicting opinions. I admit that I found some of
the questions vaguely unsatisfying, partly because recall of numerical
facts is not identical with sound economic analysis. 
In addition, I found myself constantly worrying about the questions.
For example, on taxes the question was
“About what percentage of the typical American family’s income do you think
goes to paying taxes—including all levels of government?”
This is actually a very hard question. Does “typical” mean median or
average or what the respondent thinks is a typical nuclear family? Should
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press_news/2003/trust.pdf. 
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ness taxes in the numerator, as a good public ﬁnance theorist would
recommend and a good Chicago economist would predict? (Blinder and
Krueger would not.) Should I include imputed rent on my owner-
occupied house in the denominator as the Bureau of Economic Analysis
does? (Blinder and Krueger do, but I doubt that most Americans would.)
What do we learn from an incorrect answer to this question? Apparently,
survey respondents shared some of my confusions, for they grossly over-
estimated the typical share of taxes paid by households. 
In addition to the knowledge questions, people were asked a number of
public policy questions. For example:
“Are you aware that President Bush has proposed that part of Social Security be
replaced by personal investment accounts?” 
followed by
“Do you favor or oppose this idea, or are you undecided?”
I would be surprised if most people had much knowledge of this proposal.
I, for one, have forgotten the details, and perhaps even President Bush
would have trouble explaining it clearly. The term “personal investment
accounts” has a nice ring to it, and I personally am in favor of them. In
fact, I think I already have a few of them. More of a problem is that the
term is embedded in a question that states that personal accounts are a
Bush proposal, so the question is probably heard as, “President Bush has
made a new proposal called personal investment accounts; how do you
feel about President Bush and his proposals?” Under this interpretation, it
is not a question about Social Security but about attitudes toward Bush.
Economists are always complaining about questions that are posed
without the context of the trade-offs involved. The most careful work in
this area comes from environmental economists who have designed con-
tingent valuation studies to learn about the value of pristine Alaskan
waters or of preserving whooping cranes. The lesson from these studies is
that one must be very careful to specify both the “commodity” and the
“price” to have any hope that the responses will be meaningful.
Blinder and Krueger are inconsistent in this respect. For example,
when querying about drug beneﬁts, they ask
“Would you favor or oppose adding a prescription drug beneﬁt to Medicare for
people who are not in the hospital, bearing in mind that it would have to be paid
for somehow?”
390 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
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to be paid for. But “somehow” is a little vague. It does not explain the
payment method, and so it does not really confront the respondent with a
realistic choice. The average respondent might assume that “somehow”
means “by someone else,” as in former Senator Russell Long’s ditty,
“Don’t tax you, don’t tax me, tax that fellow behind the tree.”
Even worse in this regard is the question on national health insurance:
“Do you favor or oppose what is called ‘universal health insurance coverage,’
meaning that the government would make sure that every American is covered
by a health insurance policy?”
It is not surprising that a great majority of people favor such a policy
when no price tag or tax tag is attached. I favor universal health insurance.
I would guess most of the Brookings Panel favor it, whatever it is. But it
would be better to tease out preferences with something like:
“The next question is about health insurance. One proposal is to extend the
Medicare program to all U.S. residents. Statisticians estimate that this proposal
could be ﬁnanced with a tax of $2,500 per family. Would you favor or oppose
such a proposal?”
The questions on ﬁscal policy are potentially the most illuminating,
given the widespread support of the American people for tax cuts. Here
Blinder and Krueger begin with the following:
“Do you think taxes in the United States are generally too high, too low, or
about right?”
They find that most people think taxes are too high (71 percent) and vir-
tually none (3 percent) think they are too low. I agree with most people.
I think my taxes are too high. I also think that airplanes are too crowded,
teenagers are too noisy, cell phones are a nuisance, and there are too
many SUVs. But these opinions, like the view that taxes are too high, are
of little relevance because the relevant budget constraints are nowhere in
sight. 
I mentioned above that people overestimate the typical tax rate. Is it
possible that people overestimate the size of things they dislike? Recall
that various surveys have found that people want to reduce U.S. spending
on foreign aid, but at the same time they estimate that U.S. spending on
foreign aid is 20 percent of the budget (an overestimate by about a factor
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hear that taxes are a menace to the Republic rather than that taxes are the
price of a civilized society? People may want lower taxes in return for
larger deficits, but would they want lower taxes in return for lower Social
Security benefits, fewer police, dirtier streets, and more crowded
classrooms?
Blinder and Krueger also ask whether respondents favored the Bush
tax cuts. The most important determinants of the answers are political
philosophy (liberal versus conservative) and whether the respondent
thought taxes were too high or too low to begin with. Self-interest and
demographic variables (in the form of income) play a very modest role.
Instead, what can roughly be thought of as ideology is the key determi-
nant of attitudes on central political issues such as tax cuts. 
A similar pattern of responses is seen on the questions about the impor-
tance of the federal budget deﬁcit as a problem and how to solve it.
Whether people thought taxes were part of the solution depended chieﬂy
on whether they were conservative or liberal and on whether they thought
taxes were too high to begin with. Here I worry a little about causality.
Am I conservative because I don’t like taxes, or do I dislike taxes because
I’m conservative? If the label I attach to myself describes my constella-
tion of views, what do we learn from these regressions? Don’t we really
need to go a step further and ﬁnd out why I dislike taxes? All this may
suggest that the ideology variables are not useful right-hand-side
variables.
There are many fascinating ﬁndings here, but I will end with one puz-
zle. The authors conclude that economic opinions and policy attitudes
appear to be largely independent of self-interest. They ﬁnd, for example,
that lower-income people are more likely to think taxes are too high than
higher-income people. In other areas, such as Social Security and deﬁcit
reduction, the coefﬁcient on self-interest often has the right sign, but its
importance is swamped by ideological variables. This does suggest, for
one thing, that Democratic politicians like Howard Dean could never per-
suade the guy with a pickup truck sporting a Confederate-ﬂag decal that
repealing the death tax is a bad idea. 
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Foreign Aid and World Hunger: A Study of U.S. Public Attitudes (February 2, 2001),
www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/BFW/ﬁnding1.html.
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stantial array of research in the political science literature, which con-
cludes, for example, that there are “no strong effects of personal
financial well-being on the vote.”4 This result is consistent with the view
that a substantial fraction of voters favor abolition of the inheritance tax,
even though its repeal is likely to benefit only about 1 percent of the
population.
Here a paradox lurks. Economists may recall results from the “political
business cycle” literature showing that election returns track the business
cycle, particularly for presidential elections. My colleague Ray Fair did
better than most polling ﬁrms (or the Supreme Court) in calling the 2000
election, largely on the basis of economic variables.5 Moreover, aggregate
studies over the last three decades, going back to seminal work by Gerald
Kramer,6 as well as studies in virtually every advanced democracy, make
it clear that voters punish incumbents who are running for elections when
unemployment is rising, real incomes are falling, and inﬂation is high.
How is it that voters punish incumbents who bring on bad times but do
not vote on the basis of their self-interest? 
General discussion: Several participants discussed the authors’ ﬁnding
that self-interest was not a key factor shaping views on economic issues.
Benjamin Friedman applauded the paper for its new evidence about how
people form their economic opinions. But he questioned whether atti-
tudes across income groups about tax burdens and tax cuts should be
interpreted as indifference to self-interest. He noted that the actual bur-
den of taxes differed from that implied by statutory income tax rates.
Low- and middle-income people had to pay their income and payroll
taxes out of their paychecks, whereas the well-to-do had many avenues
for avoiding high tax rates. Furthermore, assuming declining marginal
utility of income, a typical tax cut package might be expected to produce
more utility for lower-income people. Shang-Jin Wei argued that if self-
interest helped to predict ideology, the authors could be misattributing the
effect of self-interest to ideology. Olivier Blanchard noted that both ideol-
ogy and self-interest have been found by others to be related to voting
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voting on issues such as property taxes. Martin Baily suggested that peo-
ple may not be truthful in responding to questionnaires, and he cited wide
differences between how people say they voted in union elections and the
actual vote totals. 
A number of panelists discussed how other questions that the survey
did not ask might have yielded illuminating results. Robert Gordon
argued for questions that related an economic fact to a political interpreta-
tion; for example, did respondents attribute the current economic rebound
to George W. Bush’s tax cuts or to Alan Greenspan’s low interest rates?
William Dickens compared the present paper with a recent paper by
Bryan Caplan in the Economic Journal. Caplan found broad agreement
among economists on what the “right” answers were, and that more-
knowledgeable people got more answers right (that is, they agreed with
the consensus of economists). Dickens conjectured that economists would
agree less about the questions in the authors’ survey, which might explain
the low importance of knowledge in predicting views on economic pol-
icy. William Gale, following up on William Nordhaus’s comment, noted
that survey questions that omit reference to actual budget constraints
often produce very different answers than do questions framed around
realistic alternatives. He reported that proposals to balance the budget or
cut taxes typically receive strong support when asked without the con-
straint and strong opposition when asked with it. 
Austan Goolsbee discussed whether the paper’s results really under-
mined the homo economicus model. He noted that, because policies in a
democracy are set by elected ofﬁcials, self-interest may be better reﬂected
in who people vote for than in their own answers to economic questions.
Evidence that people’s answers to survey questions were inconsistent
with that model need not imply that economic policy will be inefﬁcient.
As for whether homo economicus was the relevant model for economists
to use, he reasoned that what mattered was such things as whether agents
knew their own tax rates, not whether they knew any facts about macro-
economic aggregates. 
The great heterogeneity of beliefs among the respondents received
considerable attention. Edward Glaeser noted that, since any one person’s
vote is irrelevant, the homo economicus model would predict that individ-
uals will be ill informed about the issues and that beliefs will be widely
dispersed. He saw this as a challenge to prevailing Bayesian models and a
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beliefs are formed. In this connection, he reasoned that understanding the
incentives of those who provide information as well as the framework in
which people form their views was critical; for example, in school Euro-
peans are taught in a Marxian framework whereas Americans are taught
Horatio Alger. Friedman suggested analyzing the authors’ data for con-
tent bias associated with different information sources. For example, how
did the views of those who relied on economists for economic infor-
mation differ from the views of those who relied on ministers? Andrei
Shleifer pointed out that people generally seek out providers of infor-
mation that conﬁrm their own beliefs: conservatives read and listen to
conservative media sources and liberals to liberal media sources. One
consequence is that conservatives are most likely to be confused or wrong
about those issues where the conservative media want them to be con-
fused or wrong, and liberals are most likely to be confused or wrong about
issues where the liberal media want them to be confused or wrong. 
Peter Orszag was both surprised and heartened by the survey responses
regarding the long-term Social Security deﬁcit and how to reduce it.
Recent political proposals have relied mainly or entirely on beneﬁt reduc-
tions to eliminate the prospective deﬁcits, but only 5 percent of survey
respondents chose that approach. The largest group of respondents
(34 percent) wanted a combination of tax hikes and beneﬁt cuts, which
corresponds to the approach detailed in the recent book written by Orszag
and Peter Diamond.
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